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The focus of this dissertation is the application of statistical learning and com-
putational thinking to stubborn problems in development economics and wel-
fare dynamics including the problems of poverty targeting, the identification of
heterogeneous welfare dynamics, and the assessment of the risks and returns
of diverse asset portfolios. Approaching such problems with statistical learn-
ing has allowed me to overcome some of the commonly imposed constraints
and weaken some of the commonly made assumptions that prevent us from
learning more about the empirical problem. By using out-of-sample validation
and algorithmic model building, the first chapter presents an important step for-
ward in making poverty targeting more accurate and efficient. The second chap-
ter considers the theory and empirics of poverty and welfare dynamics more
generally; the findings include several important implications for the study of
welfare dynamics in diverse asset environments. The final chapter finds evi-
dence consistent with a pattern in which households with greater initial asset
holdings also hold a riskier portfolios and enjoy greater returns to their assets;
however the analysis is limited by a poor accounting of human capital assets.
The chapter concludes that allowing for the heterogeneity of assets, including
non-physical assets, that may play a role in the livelihoods of households in
developing countries is important. This dissertation demonstrates some of the
ways in which algorithmic approaches can assist us in learning from the data.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Learning from the data
In his 2001 paper titled, ”Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures,” Breiman
makes a case for the use of algorithmic modeling to solve interesting problems.
He argues, ”if our goal as a field is to use data to solve problems, then we need
to move away from exclusive dependence on data models and adopt a more
diverse set of tools.” While the intended audience of this paper is the statistics
community, as a doctoral student in development economics, I drew a great
deal of inspiration from this rallying cry as well.
Development economists depend on a variety of methods to solve problems
including theoretical models and simulations, random control trials (RCTs), and
analyses relying on observational data. Of course, these methods are not mutu-
ally exclusive – many analyses combine multiple methods for robust findings –
however, in the past we have been overly reliant on theoretical models and at
present we uphold RCTs as the gold standard. Meanwhile, there is a preponder-
ance of observational data available for the study of development economics.
Observational data do not easily yield identification for causal inference; ob-
servational data can be messy and may defy our theoretical models. However,
there is a great deal that we can learn from such data.
My objective throughout my doctoral research has been to avoid ”exclusive
dependence” on any one method and instead adopt a diverse set of tools that
would allow me to engage in the study of welfare dynamics and poverty using
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observational data. In particular, I have heeded Breiman’s (2001) call for an
embrace of algorithmic modeling for problem solving.
The empirical study of welfare1 dynamics and poverty in developing
economies is confronted by a number of challenges. For example, the empir-
ical search for dynamic welfare thresholds is often frustrated by the fact that
observations are rarely found in the neighborhood of a threshold (Barrett et al
2016). Likewise, popular non-parametric estimators that allow for flexibility in
the estimation of welfare dynamics can produce analyses that ignore the empir-
ical heterogeneity that may have given rise to those dynamics (Naschold 2013).
Moreover, tools produced to monitor welfare dynamics and to target beneficia-
ries for anti-poverty interventions are limited by the fact that the data used to
parameterize the tool is necessarily from a different sample than that where the
tool will be applied (McBride & Nichols 2016). Finally, complex and diverse
asset environments are not easily accounted for in theory or methods.
Fortunately, increasing data availability, advances in computing power, and
powerful methods in statistical and machine learning allow us to tackle or by-
pass some of these challenges. Such methods are increasingly being applied to
other areas of economics, policy, and estimation such as predicting who will
benefit from hip replacement surgery, predicting recidivism for bail setting, and
the use of recursive partitioning for the estimation of heterogeneous treatment
effects (Mullainathan & Spiess 2017, Athey 2017). However, development eco-
nomics has been slow to embrace these approaches.
The focus of my research has been the application of statistical learning and
computational thinking to stubborn problems in development economics and
1Welfare is used in the sense of well-being throughout this work.
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welfare dynamics, including the problems of poverty targeting, the identifica-
tion of heterogeneous welfare dynamics, and the assessment of the risks and
returns of diverse asset portfolios. Approaching such problems with statisti-
cal learning has allowed me to overcome some of the commonly imposed con-
straints and weaken some of the commonly made assumptions that prevent us
from learning more about the empirical problem.
Overall, my approach has been to seek data-driven insights while remaining
grounded in economic theory. I apply this approach to three problems within
the study of poverty and welfare dynamics: poverty targeting, identification of
heterogeneous welfare dynamics, and assessment of the riskiness and returns
of diverse asset portfolios in developing economies. Below I discuss the contri-
butions of each of these papers in turn.
1.2 Poverty targeting
So as to maximize the impact of limited program budgets, anti-poverty pro-
grams such social safety nets, cash transfers, and food security interventions are
often targeted towards the poorest households in a population. However, accu-
rate identification of beneficiaries meeting the program criteria is non-trivial in
the developing world where payroll stubs and tax returns are not readily avail-
able and where household level means assessment is costly and time consum-
ing. Proxy means test (PMT) targeting is a short cut to beneficiary targeting in
such settings.
The objective of a PMT targeting tool is to quickly and accurately identify
households meeting particular targeting criteria using a model parameterized
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with already available, often nationally representative, data. For PMT tools to
serve their purpose, it is important that they perform well not only within the
data set or sample in which they were parameterized but also, especially, within
the targeted population. In chapter 2, “Retooling poverty targeting using out-of-
sample validation and machine learning”, written in collaboration with Austin
Nichols, we present evidence that the prioritization of the out-of-sample per-
formance of proxy means test targeting tools can substantially improve their
accuracy.
Using the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
poverty assessment tool and data, we use two methods to improve the out-
of-sample performance of PMT tools: 1) the selection of a PMT model based
on its cross-validation performance and 2) the use of stochastic ensemble meth-
ods, which have cross-validation built in, to develop the tools. Cross-validation
offers insight into how the tool will perform out of sample. Stochastic ensem-
ble methods in general, and quantile regression forests in particular, offer data-
driven model building (variable selection) and extremely flexible model param-
eterization. In the country level case studies we analyze, prioritization of the
out-of-sample performance of these targeting tools via these two methods sig-
nificantly improves their accuracy.
This work, published in the World Bank Economic Review in 2016, has been
at the forefront of an increasing emphasis on the use of machine learning for
more accurate poverty targeting at the household level.2 The World Bank, In-
novations for Poverty Action (IPA), and USAID, among others, are increasingly
interested in using such approaches for improved poverty monitoring, target-
2Note that contributions as Jean et al (2016) show the promise of using machine learning at
the geographic level for the purpose of poverty targeting.
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ing, and impact assessment.
The approach taken in chapter 2 sticks close to the foundational concept of
proxy means tests: the objective is to parameterize a set of proxies for the house-
holds’ means (Grosh & Baker 1995). Going forward, poverty targeting may al-
together abandon the link to “proxy means” and simply prioritize predictive
power. Recent developments in poverty targeting from IPA, such as work by
Kshirsagar et al (2017), take this approach.
By using out-of-sample validation and algorithmic model building, the work
offered in this chapter represents an important step forward in making poverty
targeting more accurate and efficient.
1.3 Heterogeneity in welfare dynamics
Chapter 3 steps back from the mechanics of poverty targeting and considers the
theory and empirics of poverty and welfare dynamics more generally. Chapter
3, “Heterogeneous welfare dynamics and structural transformation in Tanza-
nia,” takes a livelihoods-based approach to the study of welfare dynamics in
the potential presence of market failures using a long panel (1991-2010) dataset
from Kagera, Tanzania.
As mentioned above, numerous challenges confront the study of welfare dy-
namics and the direct observation of dynamic welfare thresholds in an economy.
Generally, studies of welfare dynamics that are focused on non-convexities cou-
pled with multiple financial market failures – the necessary conditions for mul-
tiple welfare equilibria and poverty traps – either consider only simple single-
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asset, two-livelihood economies or run simulations with two-technology mod-
els. The contribution of chapter 3 is to approach the data with a fully general
model that accommodates a number of market failures and places no restric-
tions on the number of technologies or livelihoods available in the economy.
In addition, empirical approaches to estimating welfare dynamics often ei-
ther collapse meaningful heterogeneity or impose researcher’s assumptions in
identifying heterogeneous subgroups. This paper allows welfare dynamics to
differ by livelihood group(s), as defined over productive asset holdings and
their allocations, thereby avoiding the collapse of diverse livelihoods into a sin-
gle population mean and allowing for empirically meaningful heterogeneity.
Estimation of the returns to assets within and across identified livelihood strate-
gies offers insights into the economy’s welfare dynamics and general develop-
ment. This approach also results in insights on the marginal returns to factors
across the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the Tanzanian economy
as well as insights on the role of migration in increasing household welfare.
However, the task of identifying livelihood groups faces challenges, one of
which is to avoid the arbitrary imposition of empirically unsupported assump-
tions on the number and content of livelihood groups within the data. Therefore
the analysis in this chapter relies on cluster analysis over household asset hold-
ings and their allocations so as to define a set of livelihood strategies. I then esti-
mate livelihood-conditioned returns to assets and associated welfare dynamics.
Migration is included in the estimation as another, possibly non-convex, tech-
nology, as there may be a prerequisite cash, human/social capital, or other asset,
threshold to migration.
The cluster analysis finds that, between 1991 and 2004, a subset of house-
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holds moves from the dominant, farm-based, livelihood to a livelihood that
allocates more assets to off-farm wage and entrepreneurial activities. In esti-
mating marginal returns to assets across livelihoods, I find significant differ-
ences in returns to business, labor, and human capital assets by livelihood strat-
egy, suggesting that households would realize locally increasing returns if they
could switch livelihoods. Locally increasing returns between livelihood strate-
gies suggests the presence of the type of non-convexities that give rise to mul-
tiple welfare equilibria. When including migration as an additional technology
that can interact with livelihoods, I find that livelihood shifts play a greater role
than migration in the increase in household consumption based returns to their
business, labor, and human capital assets.
Analysis of welfare dynamics across livelihoods suggests conditional con-
vergence and uncovers heterogeneous welfare dynamics that would be masked
in an analysis of population mean dynamics alone. Although beginning with a
flexible framework and employing a data driven strategy, my analysis confirms
many of the stylized facts of the structural transformation literature, in particu-
lar the emergence of two sectors, sector-differentiated returns to labor and other
factors, and catch-up in the low return sector.
The findings in this chapter have several important implications for the
study of welfare dynamics. First, the evolution from a single livelihood in 1991
to two livelihoods in 2004 suggests that there may be serious limitations to anal-
yses that depend on demarcated asset environments, which is the approach
taken in much of the welfare dynamics literature. For example, welfare dy-
namics estimated over land and/or livestock assets alone in this dataset would
lead to extremely misleading results for the emergent livelihood group, as hold-
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ings of land and livestock collapse to near zero for these households while their
welfare increases significantly.
The analysis also suggests that estimation of welfare dynamics at population
means, without allowing for heterogeneity to emerge, masks policy relevant
findings. Whether subsets of households are facing poverty traps, conditional
convergence, or eventual convergence, appropriate policies and interventions
can be designed to meet their needs, so long as we’re able to observe them.
Finally, as is suggested in chapter 3, use of heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects (Athey & Imbens 2016, Wager & Athey 2017) to better evaluate how anti-
poverty programming affects households is long overdue in assessment of de-
velopment interventions and is an objective for my future work.
1.4 Risks and returns in welfare dynamics
Building on the methods and insights from chapter 3, chapter 4 tackles the prob-
lem of assessing the relationship among risk, returns, and welfare in a setting
where households may diversify their asset portfolios to mitigate consumption
risk. The relationship among risk, returns, and welfare has important implica-
tions for the reproduction of inequality and persistent poverty and therefore is
critical to understand for effective anti-poverty policy making. If a household
with a low initial asset endowment is constrained to low return economic activ-
ities (or, similarily, if higher return activities come with greater risk and house-
hold risk preferences induce the household to chose the low risk, low return
activities), then not only will that household remain poor, but the gap between
those with a low endowment and those with a high endowment will only grow
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overtime, reproducing and exacerbating inequality.
The problem of estimating the riskiness of diverse asset portfolios is similar
to that of accommodating heterogeneity in the estimation of welfare dynamics.
The literature generally does not account for off-farm efforts to mitigate agri-
cultural risk, and a positive correlation among risk, returns, and initial welfare
is largely taken for granted in developing country settings. This chapter again
relies on unsupervised learning methods to avoid imposing researcher assump-
tions on the data and to avoid collapsing or assuming away the heterogeneity
in asset portfolios.
In collaboration with Leah Bevis, in this chapter I estimate the relationship
among the value of initial asset holdings, expected returns, risk, and downside
risk among Tanzanian households using Living Standards Measurement Study-
Integrated Survey on Agriculture data from 2008-2013. Cluster analysis assists
us in identifying the set of asset portfolios available in the data. In estimating
the portfolio-specific moments of the conditional consumption distribution via
fixed effects regression of consumption on a quadratic function of the assets, we
are able to estimate the conditional consumption, variance, and skewness of the
households’ portfolio specific consumption distributions.
In addition, making the assumption that households utility of consump-
tion follows constant relative risk aversion preferences, we calculate the house-
hold level risk premium associated with each portfolio. Finally, we non-
parametrically estimate the relationship among initial wealth, expected returns,
and the risk premium of each of the identified asset portfolios.
Our analysis identifies three distinct asset portfolios within the data: two
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rural/agricultural portfolios that are differentiated by the value (high and low)
of their initial asset holdings, and one urban/business portfolio. Across the
agricultural portfolios identified in our analysis, we find evidence consistent
with a pattern in which households with greater initial asset holdings also hold
a riskier portfolios and enjoy greater returns to their assets. However, we do not
find clear within-portfolio relationships between initial asset holdings, risk, and
returns. Importantly, our analysis is confronted by an important limitation that
often plagues analyses focused on asset-based welfare dynamics: we are unable
to properly account for human capital assets in our analysis. The importance
of human capital in this chapter echos the findings in the second chapter that
suggest that reliance on traditional assets such as land and livestock in such
analyses will only tell part of the story.
Going forward, we need to better account for the heterogeneity of assets
that may play a role in the livelihoods of households in developing countries,
including non-physical assets. This dissertation has taken a few steps in this
direction by demonstrating the ways in which algorithmic approaches can assist
us in learning from the data itself.
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CHAPTER 2
RETOOLING POVERTY TARGETING USING OUT-OF-SAMPLE
VALIDATION ANDMACHINE LEARNING∗
∗This chapter was written in collaboration with Austin Nichols; a version of this
paper was published in the World Bank Economic Review in 2016; the published paper
can be found at doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhw056
Accurate targeting is one of the most important components of an effective
and efficient food security or social safety net intervention (Barrett and Lentz
2013; Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004). To achieve accurate targeting, project
implementers seek to minimize rates of leakage (benefits reaching those who
dont need them) and undercoverage (benefits not reaching those who do need
them). Full means tests for identification of project beneficiaries can include de-
tailed expenditure and/or consumption surveys; while effective, such tests are
also time consuming and expensive. Proxy means tests (PMTs), a shortcut to full
means tests, were first developed for the targeting of social programs in Latin
American countries during the 1980s. PMTs have become common tools for tar-
geting and poverty assessment where full means tests are costly (Coady, Grosh,
and Hoddinott 2004). Today they are used by USAID (United States Agency
for International Development) microenterprise project implementing partners,
the World Food Program, and the World Bank, among many others for the pur-
pose of poverty assessment, beneficiary targeting, and program monitoring and
evaluation in developing countries (PAT 2014; WBG 2011).
PMT tools are typically developed by assignment of weights, or parameters,
to a number of easily verifiable household characteristics via either regression
or principal components analysis (PCA) in an available, nationally representa-
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tive data set. In the regression approach, household-level income/expenditures
or poverty status are regressed on household characteristics with the objective
of selecting and parameterizing a subset of those characteristics to explain a sig-
nificant proportion of the variation in expenditures/income or poverty status.
In the PCA approach, the parameters are generated by extracting from a set of
variables an orthogonal linear combination of a subset of those variables that
captures most of the common variation (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Hastie, Tib-
shirani, and Friedman 2009). Although each approach has its advocates, those
interested solely in targeting tend to rely on regression approaches, while PCA
has become popular among those interested in generating asset indices that may
or may not be used for targeting. Note that the problem of developing tools for
poverty targeting can be a fundamentally different problem from that of gener-
ating asset indices ; this paper speaks only to the problem of developing target-
ing tools.1
The regression approach to PMT tool development requires practitioners to
select from a large set of potential observables a subset of household character-
istics that can account for a substantial amount of the variation in the dependent
variable. In practice, this is usually done through stepwise regression and the
best performing tool is selected as that which performs best in-sample; more
recently, efforts to validate in-sample-generated tools via out-of-sample testing
have also been introduced (Schreiner 2006). Once a PMT tool has been devel-
oped from a sample from a particular population, the development practitioner
can apply the tool to the subpopulation selected for intervention to rank or clas-
1For example, we might be concerned about endogeneity but not concerned about out-of-
sample performance when generating an asset index to estimate the relationship between school
enrollment and wealth, as in Filmer and Pritchett (2001). We have no such endogeneity concern
when generating targeting tools because we are not attempting causal inference; however, out-
of-sample performance is a primary concern.
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sify households according to PMT score. This process involves implementation
of a brief household survey in the targeted subpopulation so as to assign values
for each of the household characteristics identified during tool development.
The observed household characteristics, xi j, are then multiplied by the PMT tool
weights, θ j, for each characteristic j to generate a PMT score for household i, as
shown in Equation 2.1:
PMT scorei = Σ jxi jθ j. (2.1)
In many applications, the calculated PMT scores are used to rank households
from poorest to wealthiest and the poorest households are selected as program
beneficiaries.2 In the case of the USAID poverty assessment tools that will be de-
scribed below, the use is more conservative: the PMT scores are used to quantify
the number of households above and below an identified poverty threshold so
as to ensure proper allocation of USAID funds (PAT 2014). The methodological
improvements we propose in this paper apply to both types of uses for PMT
tools.
Overall, the objective of a PMT tool is to quickly and accurately identify
households meeting particular criteria in a new setting (but under the same
data-generating process) using a model parameterized with previously avail-
able data. Therefore, for PMT tools to serve their purpose, it is important that
2There are several long-standing debates as to whether targeting tools, PCA type asset in-
dices, and/or the use of consumption or income data in the regression approach capture long
run economic status, permanent income, current consumption levels, current welfare, nonfood
spending, or something else altogether. Lee (2014) points out that much of the theoretical sup-
port for these various claims is dubious and offers a theoretically grounded approach to the
development of asset indices to measure poverty. As much as possible, we remain agnostic on
the particular type of well-being that PMT tools capture while noting that the methods we dis-
cuss and the way in which we discuss them (e.g., their interpretation as capturing household
poverty status) are standard in the literature and in practice.
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they perform well not only within the data set or sample in which they were
parameterized but also, especially, within the new data set or sample. In other
words, high out-of-sample prediction accuracy must be prioritized in the de-
velopment of PMT tools. In the fields of machine learning and predictive an-
alytics, stochastic ensemble methods have been shown to perform very well
out-of-sample due to the bias- and variance-reducing features of such methods.
In this paper, we present evidence that the prioritization of the out-of-sample
performance of PMT targeting tools can substantially improve their out-of-
sample accuracy. We propose two methods for this prioritization: (1) select-
ing a tool based on its cross-validation performance and (2) using stochastic
ensemble methods, which have cross-validation built in, to develop the tool.
Stochastic ensemble methods offer the additional feature, over and above tradi-
tional methods combined with cross-validation, of selecting the variables with
which to build the tool, an otherwise time-consuming process. We take a set of
PMT tools that have been developed by the University of Maryland IRIS Cen-
ter (IRIS: Institutional Reform and Informal Sector) for the purpose of USAID
poverty assessment for demonstration of these methods; however, the methods
applied in this paper should be considered for PMT and other poverty targeting
tool development more broadly.
We next present the USAID poverty assessment tool development and accu-
racy evaluation criteria; we then introduce the stochastic ensemble algorithms,
regression forests, and quantile regression forests, that we apply to the problem
of developing more accurate out-of-sample targeting tools; an explanation of
our data and methods follows. We close with results and conclusions.
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2.1 The USAID Poverty Assessment Tool
The development of the USAID poverty assessment tool (PAT) dates from 2000,
when the US Congress passed the Microenterprise for Self-Reliance and Interna-
tional Anti-Corruption Act, mandating that half of all USAID microenterprise
funds benefit the very poor (PAT 2014). In the context of this legislation, the
very poor are defined as those households living on less than the equivalent of
a dollar per day or those households considered among the poorest 50 percent
of households below the countrys own national poverty line (IRIS Center 2005).
Subsequent legislation required USAID to develop and certify low-cost tools to
enable its microenterprise project-implementing partners to assess the poverty
status of microenterprise beneficiaries. USAID engaged the IRIS Center at the
University of Maryland in 2003 to create the tools.3 To date, the IRIS Center has
developed, and USAID has certified, tools for 38 countries.4
Using existing Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) data as well as
survey data collected by IRIS, the IRIS Center developed country-specific PAT
tools following the general PMT development procedure: they first identified
a subset of household characteristics (approximately 15) from the larger data
set of 70125 available observables that accounted for the greatest variation in
household level income via an R-squared maximization routine, SAS MAXR;5
3The implementing partners who are required to make use of the PAT include ”all projects
and partner organizations receiving at least USD 100,000 from USAID in a fiscal year for mi-
croenterprise activities in countries with a USAID-approved tool” (PAT 2014). In 2013, this
entailed 71 partners receiving a total of 110 million dollars (USAID MMR).
4Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia,
East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nige-
ria, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Tanzania, Tajikistan, Uganda,
Vietnam, and the West Bank.
5The MAXR procedure operates by selecting and rejecting variables one by one with the
objective of maximizing the improvement in a models R2 (SAS 2009).
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they then selected for the final tool the parameters identified by the statistical
modelwhether ordinary least squares (OLS), quantile regression, logit, or pro-
bitthat produced the highest predictive accuracy in-sample. In some cases, but
not all, out-of-sample validation tests were performed.
The predictive ability of the resulting PMT model was evaluated against
a number of accuracy criteriatotal accuracy, poverty accuracy, undercoverage,
leakage, and the balanced poverty accuracy criterioneach of which is defined
below. These criteria allow for ex ante evaluation of the generated poverty
assessment tools via systematic consideration of each possible outcome/error
type as presented in the confusion matrix in Table 2.1: true positive (the true
very poor, p = 1, are identified by the tool as very poor, pˆ = 1); false negative
(the true very poor, p = 1, are identified by the tool as non very poor, pˆ = 0);
false positive (the true non very poor, p = 0 , are identified by the tool as very
poor, pˆ = 1); true negative (and the true non very poor, p = 0 , are identified by
the tool as non very poor, pˆ = 0).
Table 2.1: Poverty Prediction Outcomes
p = 1 p = 0
pˆ = 1 True positive (TP) False positive (FP)
pˆ = 0 False negative (FN) True negative (TN)
Source: Standard confusion matrix
The classification literature has developed many metrics based on confusion
matrices, such as that presented in Table 2.1, for the assessment of classification
accuracy; the IRIS Center draws on standard metrics from the literature and has
also developed a new metric for their evaluation of the PAT. Following the IRIS
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Center and relying on the categories given in Table 2.1, the accuracy criteria
we use to assess PAT performance are defined as follows: total accuracy (TA)
is the sum of the correctly predicted very poor and the correctly predicted non
very poor as a percentage of the total sample, (TA=(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)).
Poverty accuracy (PA) is the correctly predicted very poor as a percentage of the
total true very poor, (PA=TP/(TP+FN)). The undercoverage rate is the ratio of
true very poor incorrectly predicted as non very poor to total true very poor,
(UC=FN/(TP+FN)), while the leakage rate is the ratio of true non very poor
incorrectly identified as very poor to total true very poor, (LE=FP/(TP+FN)).
Finally, the balanced poverty accuracy criterion (BPAC) is the correctly pre-
dicted very poor as a percentage of the true very poor minus the absolute
difference between the undercoverage and leakage rates, (BPAC=TP/(TP+FN)-
|FN/(TP+FN)-FP/(TP+FN)|). These accuracy criteria are summarized in Table
2.2.
Table 2.2: Targeting Accuracy Metrics
Total accuracy TA=(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)
Poverty accuracy PA=TP/(TP+FN)
Leakage LE=FP/(TP+FN)
Undercoverage UC=FN/(TP+FN)
Balanced poverty accuracy criterion BPAC=TP/(TP+FN)-|FN/(TP+FN)-FP/(TP+FN)|
Source: Authors’ summary based on IRIS Center 2005.
Total accuracy, or one minus mean squared error, is very familiar to
economists as a metric for model assessment. However, there are several rea-
sons why total accuracy might not be an adequate metric for assessing the ac-
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curacy of a poverty tool. Consider an example wherein a population of 100
includes 10 poor households. A tool that simply classifies the entire population
as nonpoor would have a total accuracy rate of 90 percent, which seems quite
good. However, this tool would have failed to identify a single poor house-
hold. Therefore, metrics beyond total accuracy are necessary for assessment of
poverty tool performance; these additional metrics include poverty accuracy
(also known as precision in the classification and predictive analytics literature)
and undercoverage (false negative) and leakage (false positive) rates. In the ex-
ample just given, the poverty accuracy of the tool would be 0 percent, and the
undercoverage rate would be 100 percent. These additional metrics offer a bet-
ter picture of the tools performance than does total accuracy alone. The BPAC
combines these three metricspoverty accuracy, undercoverage, and leakageby
penalizing the poverty accuracy rate with the extent to which the leakage and
undercoverage rates exceed one another. The BPAC is an innovation of the IRIS
Center; it was created to balance the stipulations of the Congressional Mandate
against the practical implications of the assessment tools (IRIS 2005). The other
criteria are standard in PMT development. However, it should be noted that
IRIS computes leakage in an unconventional manner.6
PAT model selection for each country was ultimately made by IRIS based
on the BPAC results in-sample. While we follow the prioritization of the BPAC
criteria in the analysis that follows, the methods we propose can just as easily
be used to meet other prioritized accuracy criteria.
6Whereas leakage rates are commonly computed as FP/(TP+FP), IRIS computes leakage
rates as FP/(TP+FN). This adjustment to the denominator in the calculation of leakage rates
has two consequences: 1) it can lead to calculated leakage rates that are greater than one, pro-
ducing a heavy penalty in the calculation of BPAC where leakage occurs (it is not clear that
IRIS intended for this outcome); 2) it keeps constant the denominator across poverty accuracy,
undercoverage, and leakage rates, allowing IRIS to easily perform the addition and subtrac-
tion necessary for the BPAC calculation. We assume this was IRISs purpose in modifying the
denominator.
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2.2 Stochastic ensemble methods: Regression forests and
quantile regression forests
Classification and regression trees are a class of supervised learning methods
that produce predictive models via stratification of a feature (in the case of
poverty tool development, a feature is a variable or characteristic) space into
a number of regions following a decision rule (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman
2009). A canonical and intuitive example of a classification tree is that of predict-
ing, based on a number of features such as age, gender, and class, who survived
the sinking of the Titanic.7 While both classification and regression trees can be
used to make predictions regarding the poverty status of households based on
observable household characteristics, this paper focuses on regression and, in
particular, quantile regression forests due to the advantages the latter offers in
terms of making predictions about households concentrated at the lower end of
the income distribution.
Regression trees operate via a recursive binary splitting algorithm as fol-
lows (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009): for N observations of response
variable, yi, and a vector of characteristics, xi j, where i = 1, 2,N is the number
of observations and j = 1, 2, J is the number of features, consider the splitting
variable, x j, and the split point, where xi j = s, that define the half planes R1 and
R2, as indicated in Equation 2.2:
R1( j, s) = {xi j|xi j ≤ s} and R2( j, s) = {xi j|xi j ≤ s} (2.2)
7See Varian (2014) for an example. Many examples and data are also available at The Com-
prehensive R Archive Network at http://cran.r-project.org.
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The algorithm selects x j and s to solve the minimization problem,
min js
[
min 1
nΣi(yi |xi∈R1( j,s))Σxi∈R1( j,s)(yi −
1
n
Σi(yi|xi ∈ R1( j, s)))2+
min 1
nΣi(yi |xi∈R2( j,s))Σxi∈R2( j,s)(yi − 1nΣi(yi|xi ∈ R2( j, s)))2
]
In words, the regression tree algorithm chooses the variable, x j (the splitting
variable), and the value of that variable, s (the split point), which minimizes the
summed squared distance between the mean response variable and the actual
response variables for the observations found in each of the resulting regions. In
this manner, the algorithm effectively weights the response variables by the pre-
dictive value of the observations within each region (Lin and Jeon 2006). Once
the optimal split in Equation 2.3 is identified, the algorithm proceeds within the
new partitions.
One way to think about a regression tree is as an OLS regression for which
one knows in advance all of the split variables and split points across which to
partition, and then conditionally partition, the feature space, which therefore
defines appropriate binary variables and interaction terms to capture these par-
titions. Such an OLS would return the same results as a regression tree built over
the same data. However, such split variables and split points are not known in
advance; therefore, what the regression tree algorithm offers over and above an
OLS is a heuristic method for the selection of those variables, split points, and
conditional splitsthe binary variables and their interactionswith which to build
the model so as to minimize prediction error. To do this using OLS would re-
quire a stepwise regression that iterates and then conditionally iterates through
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each split point of each variablea computationally intensive process.
The recursive binary splitting process of the regression tree can continue un-
til a stopping criterion is reached; however, larger trees may overfit the data.
In the case that we want to bootstrap over this algorithma good idea, as the al-
gorithm may make different splitting decisions in different subsets of the datait
becomes apparent that a bias for variance trade-off is made as we allow the trees
to grow large.8 A collection of larger trees will have high variance but low bias
while a collection of smaller trees will have low variance but high bias.
Fortunately, in this setting, the bias-variance trade-off can be somewhat
overcome via a process called bootstrap aggregation, or bagging. Bagging in-
volves bootstrapping a number of approximately unbiased and identically dis-
tributed regression trees and then averaging across them so as to reduce the
variance of the predictor. However, bagging cannot address the persistent vari-
ance that arises due to the fact that the trees themselves are correlated, as they
were generated over the same feature space (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman
2009). Consider, for example, a set of B identically distributed but correlated re-
gression trees, each with variance σ2. If ρ represents the pairwise correlation be-
tween the trees, then the variance of the average of these trees is ρσ2+(1−ρ)/Bσ2.
As B grows large, the term (1 − ρ)/Bσ2 will approach zero, reducing the overall
variance (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009). However, the first term, ρσ2,
persists (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009).
Reducing this persistent variance component of the bagged predictor is the
innovation of random forests. Introduced by Breiman (2001), regression forests
8A variety of options for pruning trees exist to address these issues in a regression tree frame-
work (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009). We dont discuss these here but move on instead
to random forests, which address the problem without pruning.
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improve the variance reduction feature of bagged regression trees by decorre-
lating the trees, and thereby reducing via a random selection of the features
(variables) over which the algorithm may split. The number of random features
available to the algorithm at any split is typically limited to one-third of the to-
tal number of features (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009); this is a tuning
parameter of the algorithm.
Critically, in a random forest algorithm, the mean squared error of the pre-
diction is estimated in the out of bag sample (OOB), the (on average) third of the
training data set on which any given tree has not been built (Breiman 2001), in a
manner similar to k-fold cross-validation. This OOB sample offers an unbiased
estimate of the models performance out-of-sample.
The random forest training algorithm produces a collection of B trees, de-
noted as {T (x;Θb)}B1 , where Θb indicates the bth tree. The regression forest pre-
dictor is then the bagged prediction
f̂ (xi) =
1
B
ΣBb=1 [T (xi;Θb)] . (2.4)
It has been shown that regression forests offer consistent and approximately
unbiased estimates of the conditional mean of a response variable (Breiman
2004; Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009). However, as elaborated by
Koenker (2005), among others, the conditional mean tells only part of the story
of the conditional distribution of y given X. Therefore, we also apply quantile
regression forests, as developed by Meinshausen (2006), to our PMT tool devel-
opment. Meinshausen (2006) draws on insights from Lin and Jeon (2006), who
show that random forest predictors can be thought of as weighted means of the
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response variable, yi, as shown in Equation 2.5:
f̂ (xi) =
1
B
ΣBb=1T (xi;Θb) = Σ
N
i=1
ΣBb=1wi(xi;Θb)
B
yi. (2.5)
In Equation 2.5, wi(xi;Θ) represents the weight vector obtained by averaging
over the observed values in a given region Rl, (l = 1 . . . L). Application of the
weight vector to the response variable is simply another way of considering the
conditional averaging of the response variable, as represented in Equation 2.3
above and shown in Equation 2.6:
wi(xi;Θ)yi =
1
n
Σi(yi|xi ∈ Rl( j, s)). (2.6)
With this insight, Meinshausen (2006) produces quantile regression forests,
as a generalization of regression forests in which not only the conditional mean,
but the entire conditional distribution of the response variable is estimated
(Equation 2.7):
f̂ (xi) =
1
B
ΣBb=1T (xi;Θb) = Σ
N
i=1
ΣBb=1wi(xi;Θb)
B
1 {yi ≤ y} . (2.7)
Meinshausen (2006) provides a proof for the consistency of this method and
demonstrates the gains in predictive performance of quantile regression forests
over linear quantile regression. These gains are due to the fact that quantile
regression forests retain all the bias-minimizing and variance-reducing compo-
nents of regression forests in that they bootstrap aggregate across a great num-
ber of decorrelated trees; quantile regression forests additionally offer the ability
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to make predictions across the conditional distribution. A quantile approach is
particularly useful for the purposes of PMT tool development due to the fact
that the very poor are often concentrated at one end of the conditional income
distribution, far from the conditional mean.
The advantages that stochastic ensemble methods, such as the regression for-
est and quantile regression forest algorithms, offer over traditional PMT devel-
opment tools include the selection of the variables that offer the greatest predic-
tive accuracy without the need to resort to stepwise regression and/or running
multiple model specificationsrather, the algorithms build the modeland built-in
cross-validation via the out-of-bag error estimates.
Therefore, using regression forest and quantile regression forest algorithms,
we expect to realize improvements in the out-of-sample targeting accuracy of
the PAT. We note, however, that this method requires the critical assumption
that the data-generating process remains unchanged between tool development
and tool application. That is, the algorithm can perform well out of sample but
not out of population. This limitation plagues any sample-based estimation
routine.
2.3 Empirical method and data
We produce a set of country-specific examples from the survey data that was
used by the IRIS Center to construct their PATs. We replicate the PAT develop-
ment process by extracting the same variables that IRIS extracted from the same
data sets and then generating identical estimation models. We are limited in
our replication process to the use of LSMS data sets that are publicly available.
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We have additionally constrained ourselves to the LSMS data sets for which in-
come or expenditure aggregates are also publicly available due to the challenges
of precisely replicating an income or expenditure aggregate that IRIS may have
generated.
From the publicly available data sets meeting these criteria, we selected three
nearly arbitrarily: the 2005 Bolivia Encuesta de Hogares (EH), the 2001 Timor
Leste Living Standards Survey (TLSS), and the 2004-2005 Malawi Second In-
tegrated Household Survey (IHS2). These data sets present a reasonable rep-
resentation of the settings in which PATs have been developed. Each data set
differs in number of observations, poverty level, and IRIS-selected household
characteristics. The data are summarized in Table 2.3, where we can see that
the number of household level observations ranges from 1,800 in East Timor to
11,280 in Malawi. Likewise, the USAID-defined poverty rates range consider-
ably, from 24.2 percent in Bolivia to 64.8 percent in Malawi.
Table 2.3: LSMS Surveys and Variables Used in PAT Development and
Replicated by Authors
County Data Obs. Poverty rate (%)
Bolivia 2005 Encuesta de Hogares 4,086 24.03
Malawi 2004-2005 Second Integrated Household Survey 11,280 64.78
East Timor 2001 Timor Leste Living Standards Survey 1,800 44.73
Source: Authors summary based on the data indicated as well as reports from IRIS Center 2007, 2009,
and 2012.
We provide the IRIS reported in-sample accuracy estimates for each country-
level data set in each row 1 of Appendix Table A.1. These are the estimates on
which the IRIS model selection was made. We provide the IRIS-reported out-
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of-sample accuracy assessment results for each country in rows 24 of Table A.1.
We replicate the IRIS in-sample models and report the replication estimates in
each row 5 of Appendix Table A.1. Within-country comparisons of our replica-
tion estimates (Table A.1, row 5), with the estimates reported by IRIS (Table A.1,
row 1), serve as a check on how well we have replicated the PAT tool develop-
ment process. In the case of Bolivia, our replication estimates do not perform
as well as those of IRIS; however, it should be noted that IRIS built the Bolivia
PAT tool on a randomly selected subset of the data. We cannot replicate pre-
cisely the same random draw and so report the full sample estimates. The full
sample replication does not perform as well as the half sample performance re-
ported by IRIS, but that half sample is unusual in its high performance, and not
representative of the thousand half sample splits we explored or that IRIS re-
ported for their calculation of out-of-sample performance (see rows 2 through 4
of Appendix Table A.1 for Bolivia). For this reason, we are not concerned about
spuriously overestimating the performance of our methods relative to those of
IRIS and therefore retain this data set in our analysis. In the case of East Timor
and Malawi, our replication estimates are very close to those reported by IRIS,
and we are likewise not concerned about unfair comparisons of our methods
with those of IRIS.
Our empirical approach is to randomly draw, with replacement, two sam-
ples of size N/2 from each country-level data set, producing a training sam-
ple and a testing sample. Over this split of the data, we first reproduce IRISs
methods, training their preferred model in the training data and then testing
it on 1,000 bootstrap samples of the testing data. However, instead of bas-
ing tool selection on in-sample performance as IRIS does, we perform k-fold
cross-validation in the training sample and select as our preferred model the
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one that produces the best BPAC in cross-validation. For this exercise, we use
k-fold cross-validation; in particular, we produce 500 iterations of three-fold
cross-validation, which entails training the model on two-thirds of the training
data set and assessing performance in the remaining third of the training data
set on which the model was not trained. We take this approach because it most
closely approximates the out-of-bag error produced using the stochastic ensem-
ble methods.
Following the method for out-of-sample testing used by the IRIS center, we
test the classification accuracy of the cross-validation-selected tool using 1,000
bootstrapped samples of the testing sample. The out-of-sample performance of
this tool in the testing sample is presented for each country in figures 13, as well
as in Appendix Table A.1, rows 6 through 8. We refer to this approach of using
cross-validation to select the best-performing model in the training sample as
the ”cross-validation” approach throughout remaining sections to distinguish it
from both IRISs approach and from the stochastic ensemble method approach
(note that stochastic ensemble methods also use cross-validation; however, it is
referred to as out-of-bag error in that setting).
We next turn to the stochastic ensemble methods. Over the same split of the
data as used for the cross-validation approach, the random forest and quantile
regression forest models are built in the training sample where, for any given
(xi, yi), an average of two-thirds of the training data are used to build bagged re-
gression trees and the remaining third is reserved for out-of-bag, and therefore
unbiased, running estimates of the prediction error over a forest of 500 trees.9
We run the regression forest and quantile regression forest algorithms in R us-
9Five hundred trees is the default setting in the randomForest package in R. From casual
observation, the OOB error has largely stabilized by the time the forest has reached 200300
trees; this observation is consistent with the literature (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009).
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ing packages developed by Liaw and Wiener (2002) and Meinshausen (2016),
respectively. We select our preferred model as that with the lowest BPAC error
in the OOB sample. This model is then taken to the testing sample to assess
classification accuracy. The performance of this tool in the testing sample is pre-
sented for each country in figures 13, as well as in Appendix Table A.1, rows 9
through 11.
We statistically compare the mean of the IRIS-reported bootstrapped accu-
racy estimates with those produced using both of our approaches to tool devel-
opmentthe cross-validation approach and the stochastic ensemble approachus-
ing Tukey Kramer tests, selected to account for the family-wise error rate. The
results are reported in Table 2.4.
Finally, so as to assess the robustness of our results to the poverty thresh-
olds in each country, we report in Appendix Table A.2 the performance of our
methods as compared with those of IRIS under two new poverty lines: one that
is half the original poverty line and a second that is twice the original poverty
line. We cannot observe actual IRIS tool performance metrics under these new
poverty lines, but we estimate the best possible results IRIS could have gotten
using their methods and preferred tools by adapting those tools to obtain the
greatest BPAC under the new poverty lines. In practice, this means selection of
the quantile that offers the best in-sample BPAC under the new poverty lines
in Bolivia and Malawi. In the case of East Timor, we include a quantile regres-
sion approach along with IRISs preferred approach under the original poverty
line, the probit model, because the probit performs poorly at the lower poverty
line. This means we are comparing our cross-validation and ensemble method
approaches to the best possible outcomes of the approach employed by IRIS.
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2.4 Results
Results of the cross-validation (CV) and stochastic ensemble (SE) approaches
to PMT tool development are displayed graphically in Figures 1, 2, and 3 and
numerically in Appendix table A1. In both formats, we compare the out-of-
sample bootstrap accuracy estimates of the IRIS-produced tools (rows 24 in the
Table A.1) with those produced by each of our approaches. The confidence
bars in each figure display the nonparametric bootstrap confidence intervals,
where the lower bound is the 2.5th percentile and upper bound is the 97.5th
percentile bootstrap estimate. Standard errors are reported in Table A.1. In
addition, Tukey Kramer tests of the differences in the out-of-sample bootstrap
means are reported in Table 2.4.
While cross-validation improves on the total accuracy of the IRIS-generated
tool only in the case of Bolivia and the stochastic ensemble methods do not im-
prove on the total accuracy at all (Figure 2.1, first graph), gains in poverty accu-
racy are observed using cross-validation across all countries and using stochas-
tic ensemble methods in both East Timor and Malawi (Figure 2.1, second graph).
Recall from the discussion above that total accuracy has serious limitations as a
metric for assessing the performance of a poverty-targeting tool.
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Table 2.4: Tukey-Kramer Tests of Equality of Bootstrap Poverty Accuracy
and BPAC Means across Estimates
Poverty accuracy BPAC
Estimation Difference TK test statistic Difference TK test statistic
Bolivia CV vs IRIS 5.79* 37.55 8.61* 28.20
SE vs IRIS -2.25* -14.07 0.85 2.38
CV vs SE 8.04* 54.14 7.76* 29.04
East Timor CV vs IRIS 3.69* 23.89 2.78* 11.87
SE vs IRIS 2.43* 15.43 1.29* 5.39
CV vs SE 1.26* 8.40 1.49* 7.68
Malawi CV vs IRIS 2.25* 59.06 2.19* 50.03
SE vs IRIS 2.06* 49.11 1.43* 30.85
CV vs SE 0.19 4.90 0.76* 17.51
Note: CV = cross-validation estimates; IRIS = IRIS reported estimates; SE = stochastic ensemble
estimates.
∗ Indicates difference is significant at 1% significance level.
Source: Authors estimates using data and procedures detailed in the text.
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From Figure 2.2 (first graph), we can see that these gains in poverty accu-
racy are not without trade-offs: the leakage rates for the cross-validation and
stochastic ensemble approaches are significantly greater than those reported for
the IRIS-generated tools in both Bolivia and East Timor, meaning that these tools
err on the side of classifying nonpoor households as poor. Given that leakage
rates are heavily penalized by the IRIS accuracy metrics, these increases are not
very surprising. Meanwhile, the cross-validation approach performs much bet-
ter than IRIS’s in terms of undercoverage rates; the undercoverage rate is de-
creased across all countries (Figure 2.2, second graph). The stochastic ensemble
approach likewise outperforms IRISs in both East Timor and Malawi.
Figure 2.2: Leakage and Undercoverage
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(b) Undercoverage
The critical question, then, is how these trade-offs net out in terms of USAIDs
key accuracy metric, the BPAC. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that the accuracy of the
cross-validation approach outperforms that of the IRIS-generated tool in each
country. Improvements range from 2.7 percent in Malawi to 17.5 percent in Bo-
livia. The performance of the stochastic ensemble approach closely follows that
of the cross-validation approach in both East Timor and Malawi; although the
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cross-validation results are statistically significantly different from the stochas-
tic ensemble results, the magnitude of those differences is trivial in the case of
Malawi and quite small in the case of East Timor (Table 2.4).
Figure 2.3: BPAC
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Balanced Poverty Accuracy
In addition to gains in average BPAC, we also see large gains in the lower
bound (2.5th percentile) performance using cross-validation and stochastic en-
semble methods. The cross-validation (stochastic ensemble) approach improves
the lower bound BPAC accuracy in Boliva by 38 (7) percent, in East Timor by 11
(8) percent, and in Malawi by 3 (2) percent.
Although the gains in poverty accuracy and BPAC in Malawi using the cross-
validation approach are not as impressive as those in Bolivia and East Timor,
note that the tool is able to outperform the already relatively accurate IRIS tool
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for Malawi in terms of these metrics while also reducing both the leakage and
undercoverage rates.
The relatively strong performance of the cross-validation approach com-
pared with the stochastic ensemble approach is due to the fact that the cross-
validation approach benefits from IRISs time and effort in selecting from a large
set of possible variables a subset that explains much of the variation in the de-
pendent variable. Because we have limited our analysis to the same subset of
variables as selected by IRIS for their preferred models, the relative strengths
of the stochastic ensemble methods in terms of variable selection are not well
displayed through this analysis. Therefore, it remains an open question (that
we plan to address in a later paper) as to whether our stochastic ensemble
approach would outperform the combination of IRISs parametric model with
cross-validation had we begun with the full set of 70125 variables instead of the
selected subset. Our analysis does suggest, however, that the proxy means test
tool developer who prefers to skip the time-consuming and computationally in-
tensive process of stepwise regression followed by the comparison of multiple
model specifications would do at least nearly as well in terms of out-of-sample
performance as the tool developer who does take the time to perform these
analyses and then combine them with cross-validation.
Finally, the robustness results for the assessment of tool performance un-
der new poverty lines are reported in Appendix Table A.2. From a comparison
of rows 2, 6, and 9 for each country, we can see that the cross-validation and
stochastic ensemble approaches perform about the same as the IRIS approach
under the new poverty lines. Overall, however, across all results, including the
robustness results, we find that the cross-validation and stochastic ensemble
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approaches do no worse than, and in many cases substantially outperform, the
traditional approach to PMT tool development.
2.5 Conclusion
We have proposed methods for the improvement of a particular type of poverty-
targeting tool: proxy means test targeting. In the country-level case studies
analyzed here, prioritization of the out-of-sample performance of these target-
ing tools during tool development either through selecting a model based on
its cross-validation performance or using a method such as stochastic ensem-
ble methods that both selects variables and performs cross-validation along the
way can significantly improve the out-of-sample performance of these tools. In
particular, we find that application of cross-validation and stochastic ensem-
ble methods to the problem of developing a poverty-targeting tool produces a
gain in poverty accuracy, a reduction in undercoverage rates, and an overall
improvement in BPAC in comparison to traditional methods.
Our analysis takes as given the IRIS-selected PAT variables so as to demon-
strate the power of machine learning methods in this setting; however, begin-
ning with a larger set of variables over which the stochastic ensemble methods
may build a targeting model may produce even greater gains in targeting accu-
racy for this approach than observed here. Therefore, the gains in accuracy we
have reported are likely conservative. Moreover, applying a stochastic ensemble
approach over a larger set of variables would obviate the time-consuming tasks
of both stepwise regression for variable selection and the process of running and
comparing the performance of multiple statistical models, as was done by the
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IRIS center. Overall, our findings suggest that further exploration of machine
learning methods for PMT tool development is merited.
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CHAPTER 3
HETEROGENEOUSWELFARE DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION IN TANZANIA
3.1 Introduction
Welfare dynamicsi.e. the evolution of welfare over time in terms of income, ex-
penditures, assets, or another measure that captures the economic well-being
of an individual or householdcan offer insight into the inequality between, and
growth prospects of, the poorest sectors of an economy. In addition, multiple
equilibria welfare dynamics arising from non-convex technologies and multi-
ple financial market failures are posited as one explanation for the puzzling and
persistent gap in productivity between agricultural and non-agricultural sec-
tors as well as the consumption gap between rural and urban households in
economies across the globe.
Whereas much of the literature on welfare dynamics relies on two-
production-technology theoretical models and simulations and whereas much
of the literature on the agricultural productivity gap categorizes households
into agricultural and non-agricultural households based on a binary decision
rule, this paper begins with a flexible theoretical model and allows the num-
ber and type of livelihood strategies, unknown a priori to the researcher, to
be determined by the data. Such an approach allows for the possibility that
household income generating activities may be incremental and therefore fail
to fit neatly into agricultural/non-agricultural-sector dichotomies. For exam-
ple, McCullough (2016) finds that households in Tanzania 2010/2011 diversify
into non-agricultural activities without leaving agriculture. In addition, there
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may be multiple, sufficiently different, income-generating activities within each
of the agricultural and/or non-agricultural sectors to constitute an additional
livelihood, the returns to which merit further investigation. Despite the possi-
bility of heterogeneous welfare dynamics within and between sectors, popular
approaches to the estimation of welfare dynamics and to the identification of
the causes of the productivity gap are limited to population means and ad-hoc
dichotomies.
In this paper, I examine welfare dynamics in a setting where the livelihood
strategy choice set is complex and evolves over time, and where returns to as-
sets are potentially conditioned by livelihood strategies and by geography via
migration. By livelihood strategies, I mean the Barrett et al. (2000) definition
of livelihoods as the opportunity set afforded an individual or household by
their asset endowment and their chosen allocation of those assets to generate
a stream of benefits (p.2). This definition of livelihoods focuses on mapping
assets and their allocations to welfare and will serve as the basis for the theoret-
ical model developed below. My approach is to empirically identify livelihood
strategies using k-medoids cluster analysis, allowing the number of clusters to
be determined by the gap statistic method (Tibshirani et al. 2001). I then assess
marginal returns to assets by livelihood and by livelihood and migration status.
Locally increasing returns by livelihood or migration status would offer addi-
tional, micro-level, insights to the empirical findings on the productivity and
consumption gaps between sectors and rural/urban environments observed by
Gollin et al (2014) and Young (2013). I also examine the welfare dynamics for
each of the identified livelihood groups. This approach also allows me to ob-
serve, in an entirely data driven way, any structural shifts taking place in the
economy through differentiated returns to the livelihoods that emerge. The
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analysis uses three waves of the Kagera (Tanzania) Health and Development
Survey (KHDS), 1991 to 2010.
I find that, between 1991 and 2004, a subset of households moves from the
single, farm-based, livelihood of Kagera, Tanzania to a livelihood that allocates
more assets to off-farm wage and entrepreneurial activities. In other words,
the cluster analysis splits households between agricultural and non-agricultural
livelihoods, into the classic dual economy assumed elsewhere (Timmer 1988,
Gollin et al 2014). I find evidence for differences in returns to business, labor,
and human capital assets by livelihood strategy and by migration, supporting
the findings on the production and consumption gap of Gollin et al (2014) and
Young (2013), but without imposing a binary division in the data. In addition, I
find evidence for heterogeneous welfare dynamics, such as would be masked in
an analysis of population mean welfare dynamics alone; however, the equilibria
appear to converge over time, suggesting a catch-up in returns in the agricul-
tural sector. These findings offer another observation in the debate as to whether
livelihood shifts or geography (migration) drives the increase in returns. I find
that, in this setting, livelihood shifts play a greater role in increasing returns than
does migration. Finally, there is no evidence of a multiple equilibria poverty
trap in this setting.
3.2 Background and literature review
This paper draws on and speaks to a number of literatures, including the lit-
erature on welfare dynamics and the theory of poverty traps, the literature on
structural transformation and the agricultural productivity gap, and the ongo-
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ing debate over the role of geography in both welfare and productivity.
The theory of poverty traps suggests that we should see multiple equi-
libria welfare dynamics emerge in the presence of multiple market failures
and non-convex production technologies (Galor & Ziera 1993, Barrett 2005,
Barrett et al 2016). Generally, studies of welfare dynamics that are focused
on non-convexities coupled with multiple financial market failures either run
simulations with two-technology models or study empirical data on simple,
two-technology economies such as livestock based economies in rural Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe (Lybbert et al. 2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Santos & Bar-
rett 2016, Hoddinott 2006). In such settings, two technologies are available to
households: 1) a sufficiently large herd size to sustain transhumance, and 2)
a small herd size that constrains households to sedentary living and a poorer,
cultivation-based livelihood. The combined outer envelope of these produc-
tive technologies is non-convex, suggesting that households would experience
increasing returns to their livestock holdings if they could switch from the low-
return technology to the high return technology. In the face of market failures,
such as thin credit and insurance markets, this non-convexity means that initial
conditions determine long run outcomes and that shocks may have devastating
permanent consequences (Barrett & Carter 2013).
While multiple equilibria poverty traps have been empirically observed in
such rural nomadic economies, observation outside of such settings is rare. As
Kraay & McKenzie (2014) argue in their review of the evidence on poverty traps,
multiple equilibria welfare dynamics should not emerge where multiple pro-
duction technologies are available and where it is relatively easy to move from
one technology to another. Even in the face of market failures, if there exist suf-
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ficiently many technologies, the outer envelope of the productive technology
set may be convex. Such a scenario might exist in settings where livelihoods
include various combinations of cultivation, wage labor, and small household
enterprises such that the shift from one technology to another is incremental,
e.g., raising additional livestock or investing in seeds for an additional agri-
cultural commodity. Kraay & McKenzie (2014) support this point by showing
that the distribution of start-up costs across a range of microenterprises in Sri
Lanka is not only relatively continuous but also heavily right-skewed. With a
few exceptions (Adato et al 2006, Carter et al. 2007, Naschold 2012, Kwak &
Smith 2013), estimation of welfare dynamics in complex economies fails to find
multiple equilibria welfare dynamics.
In an economy where multiple livelihood strategies are available, popula-
tion mean welfare dynamics may disguise underlying heterogeneity (Adato et
al 2006); it is not enough to consider mean dynamics. In analyses of welfare
dynamics in economies with complex asset environments, various parametric
(Adato et al 2006) and non-parametric (Naschold 2012) methods are used to
generate an asset index. Because assets are collapsed into a single index using
these approaches, heterogeneity in welfare dynamics based on particular initial
assets, or combinations of assets, is generally not observed. Moreover, the wel-
fare dynamics that are observed in these settings are sensitive to the method
used to construct the asset index (Michelson et al. 2013). In this paper, I allow
welfare dynamics to differ by livelihood groups, as defined over productive as-
set holdings and their allocations, thereby avoiding this collapse and allowing
for empirically meaningful heterogeneity in my estimated welfare dynamics.
Very few papers consider heterogeneity in welfare dynamics; in part this is
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because there are many ways to slice a data set or an analysis into heterogeneous
groups, but few are theoretically or empirically meaningful. Rather, approaches
entail either examining population mean dynamics (e.g., Adato et al. 2006), the-
oretically specifying differences in advance, such as high or low technology and
high or low ability, and then observing dynamics in the two dimensional space
they create–this is the approach taken by Ikegami et al. (2016) and Santos &
Barrett (2016)–or examining heterogeneity in observable individual, household,
or geographical characteristics (e.g., Naschold 2012, Giesbert & Schindler 2012,
Kwak & Smith 2013).
Assessment of heterogeneity in welfare dynamics by looking at differences
along observable characteristics has the drawback that it may simply impose the
researchers’ assumptions on the data without yielding empirical insights. For
example, heterogeneity in dynamic welfare equilibria is examined by Naschold
(2012) in terms of differences in caste, education, and landholdings in India and
by Giesbert & Schindler (2012) in terms of differences in immigration status and
education in Mozambique. However, the equilibrium values for each of the re-
searcher identified subgroups have overlapping confidence intervals. Alterna-
tively, Kwak & Smith (2013) examine both geographic and income heterogeneity
in welfare dynamics in Ethiopia, finding that welfare dynamics differ if one is in
the 25th versus the 75th quantile of the income distribution and that the Enset
growing region of Ethiopia faces stagnation as compared with others. The few
approaches that consider heterogeneity in welfare dynamics emerging from ini-
tial heterogeneous conditions in asset holdings do so through simulation. Both
Dercon (1998) and Zimmerman & Carter (2003) find heterogeneous portfolio
strategies emerging from heterogeneity in initial wealth/asset holdings based
on dynamic stochastic models of asset accumulation that account for risk and
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market failures.
The contribution of this paper is to approach the data with a fully general
model that accommodates a number of market failures and places no assump-
tions or restrictions on the number of technologies/livelihoods available in the
economy. Under this approach, we can be confident that any differences in
livelihoods and/or equilibria that emerge in the economy under study are due
to the data and not to theoretical or ad-hoc assumptions.
While this paper did not set out to identify differences in marginal returns
to assets between agricultural and non-agricultural households, the data driven
strategy produced just such a divide. Consequently, the findings speak to a large
literature that attempts to explain production and consumption gaps between
agricultural and non-agriculutral households within (and across) countries. The
agricultural productivity gap – the empirical observation that returns to labor
are greater outside of agriculture than within agriculture (Gollin et al 2014) and
the associated finding that cost of living adjusted consumption is greater in
urban than in rural areas (Young 2013) – presents a compelling problem as it
suggests great opportunity for arbitrage as well as a means through which to
address inequality and spur growth, by correcting the missallocation of factors
across sectors and locations (Young 2013, Lakagos & Waugh 2013, Gollin et al
2014, McMillan & Rodrik 2011).
Gollin et al (2014) attempt to identify the source of the agricultural produc-
tivity gap by considering all the usual suspects, e.g., systematic measurement
errors, differences in working hours, and differences in human capital across
sectors. Depsite adjusting for all these factors, Gollin et al (2014) find that the
productivity gap remains large. They conclude that their findings are consistent
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with a story of self-selection wherein those with sufficient skill switch sectors.
A strong case for the selection view has been made by others as well: Her-
rendorf & Schoellman (2018) find that ”agricultural workers have lower innate
ability” than do those in non-agricultural sectors, Lakagos & Waugh (2013) find
that those in agriculture have both a comparative and absolute advantage in
that sector (Lakagos & Waugh 2013), and Young’s (2013) findings are consistent
with the efficient allocation of human capital as those with unobserved skill
(correlated with observed education) relocate to the urban environment.
Young (2013), Lakagos & Waugh (2013), Gollin et al (2014), and Herrendorf
& Schoellman (2018) find that the productivity and consumption gaps are due
to efficient sorting (selection) of labor on innate ability, comparative advantage,
or unobserved skill rather than the consquences of barriers to mobility, market
failures, or poverty traps. In fact, Herrendorf & Schoellman (2018) find that the
barriers to the movement of labor from one livelihood to another are very small
and Lakagos & Waugh ’s (2013) model suggests that wage differences between
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors can exist even in the absence of
barriers to labor mobility.
If innate ability, comparative advantage, or unobserved skill are randonly
distributed, then the absence of barriers arguments would be more compelling.
However, if there are path dependencies to the distribution of ability (which,
e.g., Lagakos & Waugh (2013) proxy for with schooling attainment and which
Young (2013) finds is highly correlated with the unobserved skill on which la-
bor geographically sorts) – and there is overwhelming evidence that human
capital development is linked to parental resources – then the possibility that
multiple equilibria welfare dynamics are playing a role cannot be dismissed.
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For example, in an analysis of livelihoods and welfare dynamics in Western
Tanzania in the 1990s, Dercon (1998) observed occupational choices that could
not be explained by comparative advantage; rather, due to market failure, risk,
and the lumpy investments required to access a greater asset accumulation dy-
namic pathway, those with low initial endowments remain in low-risk, low-
return livelihood activities, meaning that initial poverty is self-perpetuating.
With some exceptions, most of the data used for analysis of the productivity
gap rely on macro-level data. Gollin et al (2014) and Young (2013) present the
first approaches using micro-data, with Gollin (2014) relying on LSMS data and
Young (2013) on DHS data. McCullough (2017) also presents a departure from
the aggregate data, macro approach and arrives at novel conclusions regarding
the source of the agricultural productivity gap. Using household level LSMS-
ISA data from Tanzania 2010/11, McCullough (2017) finds that the productivity
gap is smaller than reported using macro-data and that at least half of the gap is
due to fewer labor hours supplied in the agricultural sector (rather than lower
productivity per hour-worker in the agricultural sector).
Therefore, to this literature, I make a few contributions. As mentioned above
in relation to heterogeneous welfare dynamics, in contrast to Gollin et al (2014)
and others, I allow the data to sort itself into meaningful livelihood groups
based on household asset holdings and their allocations, which additionally
allows for the possibility that there may be fewer or more meaningful sectors
in the economy than the agricultral and non-agricultral sectors (though this
doesn’t turn out to be the case). In contrast to Lakagos & Waugh (2013) and
Herrendorf & Schoellman (2018), I rely on household level survey data. In con-
trast to Young (2013) who considers only migration, I consider both livelihood
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and migration, allowing me to assess the relative contributions of each to the
higher consumption outcomes that are observed. Finally, I estimate welfare dy-
namics within and between livelihoods.
In addition to Young’s (2013) finding of geographic sorting based on skill,
a number of other scholars have estimated the returns to migration and found
that migration is a promising route out of poverty (Clemens, Montenegro &
Pritchett 2008, Narayan & Petesch 2007, Bryan, Chowdhury, & Mobarak 2014,
Christiaensen et al 2013). However migration is also tied up with livelihood
shifts, self-selection, welfare dynamics, and poverty traps. There may be a pre-
requisite cash, human/social capital, or other asset, threshold to migration that
cannot be overcome due to local market failures, giving rise to bifurcating wel-
fare dynamics characterized by high returns for those who migrate and low
returns for those who remain behind. In other words, one might consider mi-
gration just another, possibly non-convex, technology.
Ravallion & Woden (1999) ask, are there poor areas, or only poor people?
Using data from Bangladesh in the early 1990s, they find that poor areas are not
a consequence of the concentration of households with observable attributes
that foster poverty; rather they find geographically determined differences in
returns. Likewise, Jalan & Ravallion (2002) and Kwak & Smith (2013) find that
geographic characteristics can affect the productivity of households productive
capital. And in their review, Kraay & McKenzie (2014) find that the evidence
most consistent with the theory of poverty traps is that of geographic poverty
traps.
However, examination of geographically determined welfare poses several
challenges; in particular, selection into migration or geographic location is en-
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dogenous. Using an RCT set-up, Bryan et al (2014) overcome this challenge.
They find positive and significant local average treatment effects for seasonal
internal migration in Bangladesh, raising the question of why more households
don’t migrate. Their findings are consistent with poverty trap-like dynamics in
which very poor households must overcome a cash-on-hand threshold. They
also find that migration is an ”experience good”, meaning that any learning
must be individual; in this sense there is also an experience threshold to over-
come.
In addition, Christiaensen et al (2013) find that the majority of households
from Kagera, Tanzania exiting poverty in the period 1991-2010 do so by migrat-
ing to secondary towns (towns with a population of 500,000 or less) and not to
urban centers. However, those who did migrate to urban centers experienced
faster consumption growth. In other words, there is heterogeneity in returns in
terms of migration destination. I include migration to any destination (not just
urban areas) in my estimation as a technology that can interact with livelihoods.
I also consider both livelihood and location shifts and the extent to which each
contributes to observed gains in consumption. However, in contrast to Bryan et
al (2014), I have no plausible identification.
Finally, the region of study in this paper, Kagera, Tanzania, has been exten-
sively studied due to the unique longitudinal panel data set collected there. Key
analyses include De Weerdt (2010), Beegle et al (2011), and Christiaensen et al
(2013). Overall these analyses capture important transitions between 1991 and
2010 in Kagera in particular and Tanzania in general as households grow, split,
diversify, and migrate; each analysis finds significant welfare returns to liveli-
hood diversification, migration, and living in less remote areas (either initially,
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or though migration).
Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, De Weerdt (2010) identi-
fies two pathways out of poverty in Kagera, Tanzania between 1991 and 2004:
agriculture and business/trade. Initial conditions in 1991/94in particular, initial
stocks of land and human capital as well as location factors such as the degree
of connectedness of the place of residencedetermine outcomes in 2004. Overall,
he finds that those individuals who diversified their livelihood activities (crops,
non-farm earnings) had better outcomes in 2004 than those who remained in
traditional farming.
Beegle et al. (2011) focus on the role of migration in improved welfare for
individuals from Kagera. Like De Weerdt (2010), Beegle et al. (2011) find that
there are greater returns to diversification than to traditional farming but that
those who have migrated have greater gains in consumption no matter their
livelihood activity. While De Weerdt (2010) identifies the value of connectedness
in initial location, Beegle et al. (2011) find that the connectedness of the location
to which an individual migrates is also important, as it has a significant positive
effect on consumption regardless of livelihood activity.
Christiaensen et al. (2013) take a closer look at the diversification and mi-
gration patterns suggested by De Weerdt (2010) and Beegle et al. (2011). Chris-
tiaensen et al. (2013) examine the transitions among farming and non-farming
activities in small towns (rural areas and secondary cities), and industry and
service labor in cities between 1991 and 2010, finding that the majority of those
who escaped poverty did so not by moving to cities but by either diversifying
into non-farm activities or migrating to small towns, or both. These findings
suggest that it is not necessary to migrate to the city to realize returns to diver-
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sification, migration, and connectedness.
3.3 Theoretical model
To incorporate the flexible understanding of a livelihood as a function that maps
assets and their allocations to a stream of benefits (Barrett et al. 2000) into a
model that allows for a variety of household specific market failures (deJanvry,
Fafchamps, & Sadoulet 1991, deJanvry & Sadoulet 2005), my approach is to
combine the Barrett (2008) model of household market participation decisions
with a dynamic model of asset accumulation building on Ikegami et al (2016),
Carter & Ikegami (2009), and Buera (2009). I extend these models to include K
livelihood strategies, each of which can contain any combination of productive
technologies.
Assume that household h at time t has asset stock Adht, where each asset is
indexed by d = 1, ...D; these assets might include labor, land, livestock, other
physical capital (such as business and farm assets), and human capital (such as
education and health). A set of livelihood strategies, Lk, k = 1,K are available to
the household (Expression 1). Each livelihood strategy is a function of a set of
production technologies, f j(Adht), where j = 1, J indexes the commodity output.
{
L1( f j(Adht)), L2( f
j(Adht)), ...LK( f
j(Adht))
}
(3.1)
To illustrate how technologies might combine to form livelihood strategies
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that produce commodities, consider two example livelihood strategies, L1 and
L2. L1 might include both maize farming and wage labor,
L1 = ( f maize(Alandht , A
labor
ht ), f
wagelabor(Alaborht , A
education
ht )) (3.2)
while L2 might include maize farming and milk production
L2 = ( f maize(Alandht , A
labor
ht ), f
milk(Alivestockht , A
equipment
ht )). (3.3)
There exist fixed costs, FCLk , and transactions costs to employing a given
combination of technologies (i.e., a given livelihood strategy). While the fixed
costs faced by a household depend only on the livelihood strategy employed
by the household, transactions costs faced by a household, TC jht(Zht,Aht,Et, f
j),
are a function of household characteristics, Zht, household asset stocks, Aht,
characteristics of the local environment, Et, and the vector of productive tech-
nologies employed, f j. Along the outer envelope of optimal livelihood strate-
gies, greater fixed costs are associated with higher return livelihoods such that
FCLk < FCLk+1 < FCLK , as any option with high fixed costs but low returns would
be strictly dominated.1
The household can either be a net seller, M js, or a net buyer, M jb, of a given
commodity, where M js,M jb ∈ {0, 1}; a household can also be autarkic with re-
1With this simplifying assumption, I am assuming households select their optimal livelihood
strategies conditional on associated fixed costs.
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spect to a commodity, in which case M js = M jb = 0. A household cannot be both
a net seller and net buyer; i.e., there is no case where M js = M jb = 1.
The household faces market price, p jt , for each commodity it buys and sells;
however, the household specific price, p j
∗
ht , is modulated by transactions costs as
well as the households status relative to the market,
p j
∗
ht = p
jm
t + (M
jb
ht − M jsht )TC jht(Zht,Aht,Et, f j), where M jbht , M jsht
p j
∗
ht = p
ja
ht , where M
jb
ht = M
js
ht = 0 (3.4)
Barrett (2008) points out that market participation decisions are analytically
similar to technology choice decisions; a market exchange that tranforms phys-
ical goods and services into money metric net revenue has the same properties
it is a quasi-concave and monotone mapping from the goods and services sold
into net revenues as a production technology, allowing one to nest market par-
ticipation decisions within the choice of production technologies. One can think
of the transactions costs to technology adoption as the costs generating shadow
prices that influence market participation decisions; therefore, just as multiple
technologies can be employed in a single livelihood, so can we include partic-
ipation (or non-participation) in multiple markets, such as selling maize in the
market and producing milk for home consumption only, as show in L3. Sim-
ilarly, we can think of the decision to migrate or not as either a labor market
participation decision or a technology adoption decision.
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L3 = ( f maizemarket(Alandht , A
labor
ht ), f
milkautarkic(Alivestockht , A
equipment
ht )) (3.5)
The household earns income, yht, from the production and sale of commodi-
ties, having selected2 its optimal livelihood strategy,
yht = (Σ
JLk
j=1p
j∗
ht f
j(Aht)|max
{
L1( f j(Adht)), L2( f
j(Adht)), ...LK( f
j(Adht))|FCLk
}
) (3.6)
For all commodities not traded in the market due to market participation
decisions emerging from the transactions costs faced by the household, i.e., for
all j < M, consumption is constrained by household production (assuming away
carryover stocks from one period to the next),
c jht ≤ f j(Aht) (3.7)
The household maximizes utility over consumption of a vector of agricul-
tural, small enterprise, or wage-labor produced commodities, c j, as well as other
tradables, x, that the household cannot produce. The household is subject to
budget constraints. Let px represent the price of commodities the household
cannot produce. Then the household budget is,
2This model abstracts from whether the livelihood strategy selection is due to inherent ability
or risk preferences.
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pxt
′xht + Σ
JLk
j=1p
j∗
htc
j
ht + I
d(yht) ≤ yht (3.8)
where Id(yht) is a function that maps income into assets via investment. The
asset accumulation law of motion is
Adht+1 ≤ δtAdht + Id(yht) (3.9)
where δt > 0 can be either greater than one (to capture interest, the fact that
livestock beget more livestock, etc) or between zero and one (to capture depre-
ciation).
Finally, let Aht ≥ −B(Aht) where B is the net borrowing constraint as a func-
tion of household assets, meaning that financial market failures may be house-
hold specific. Households with adequate asset holdings might be deemed cred-
itworthy; that is, with a sizable positive entry in one element of the A vector
(e.g., land holdings), the household will be able to borrow (i.e., have significant
negative net holdings of) another asset (e.g., cash) as it is able to offer some
assets as collateral.
Altogether, the households dynamic welfare maximization problem can be
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represented as follows:
maxcht ,xht ,IdΣ
∞
t=1β
t−1u(chtxht)
sub ject to :
pxt
′xht + Σ
JLk
j=1p
j∗
htc
j
ht + I
d(yht) ≤ yht
yht = (Σ
JLk
j=1p
j∗
ht f
j(Aht)|max
{
L1( f j(Adht), L2( f
j(Adht)), ...LK( f
j(Adht))|FCLk
}
)
c jht ≤ f j(Aht), j < M
Adht+1 ≤ δtAdht + Id(yht)
Aht ≥ −B(Aht)
(3.10)
This model allows for, but does not assume, multiple market failures such as
borrowing constraints and non-separability of household production and con-
sumption decisions. For example, where a household can borrow, it will opti-
mally choose a livelihood with a marginal return equal to the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption today and consumption in the next period;
but if it cannot borrow (Aht ≥ 0), the standard Euler equation becomes kinked
(Deaton 1991) and the household dissaves. Where production and consumption
decisions are non-separable, household shadow prices create a wedge between
sales and purchase prices leading to poor or non-transmission of market prices
and other inefficiencies (Barrett 2008). In addition, this model is not limited to
two technologies or two livelihoods; in fact it imposes no constraints on the
technology choice set. In relaxing the assumption of complete and competitive
markets and in imposing no constraints on the technology choice set, this is a
fully general model.
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The key structural arguments of the livelihood conditioned returns to assets
are estimable in reduced form. In particular, returns to assets will be estimated
via Taylor series expansion of the reduced form expression relating welfare to
assets in Equation 3.11,
eht = f j(Adht) + ht (3.11)
where eht represents consumption expenditures, the best available repre-
sentation of welfare in the KHDS data, measured as eht = Σ
JLk
j=1c
j
ht(p
j
t +
TC jht(Zht,Aht,Et, f
j)).
3.4 Data
The analysis uses three waves of the KHDS. The first wave began in 1991 (and
continued through 1994), the second tracked and revisited households in 2004,
the third in 2010. The survey instrument changes between 1991, 2004, and 2010
such that by 2004 it is no longer possible to observe land (acres) allocated to
different crops and by 2010 it is no longer possible to observe labor (hours) al-
located to different occupations. Therefore, the cluster analysis and returns to
assets estimations are performed using only the 1991 and 2004 data sets. The
2010 data are included in the estimation of welfare dynamics.
The KHDS data are interesting for several reasons: they present a long panel
with very low attrition rates92 percent of baseline households were tracked
through to 2010and they cover a period when Tanzania is undergoing structural
transformation (Christiaensen, De Weerdt, & Todo 2013). The initial 1991 sur-
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vey was implemented for the purpose of studying the effects of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic on welfare, and households were purposively sampled to that end.
The sample is not intended to be representative of the general population of
Tanzania or of Kagera. For further details about the region and the data, see De
Weerdt (2010), Beegle et al. (2011), De Weerdt & Hirvonen (2016).
Table 3.1 suggests that financial market failures are a possible constraint in
this setting: of those individuals starting businesses in 2010, 3 50% relied on
own savings for start-up capital, 15% sold assets or crops, and 18.6% relied on
friends/relatives; only 5.6% used formal or informal institutions. Table 3.1 also
suggests that there is not a great deal of diversification of sourcing for start-
up capital, as 86% of businesses reported not drawing on a second source for
funding.
Households from and within Kagera have enjoyed growth in consumption
over the course of the longitudinal study. Cumulative densities of per capita
consumption in 1991, 2004, and 2010, using data in 2010 TZS value that has
been deflated using a regional price index, are presented in Figure 3.1. The
horizontal line in the figure represents the national poverty line. From 1991
to 2004, most of the shift in consumption takes place above the poverty line,
suggesting that those below the poverty line may be trapped in a low welfare
equilibrium; however, between 2004 and 2010 we see movement along the full
distribution and a much larger shift overall.
Overall, the sample is upwardly mobile with 59 percent of the 1991 poor
transitioning out of poverty by 2004 and 60 percent of the 2004 poor transition-
3Data on sources of start-up capital were not collected in earlier waves of the KHDS. Given
the attention on microfinance in the 2000s, it is reasonable to assume that credit availability to
households in Kagera in earlier periods was no better than, and possibly worse than, that in
2010.
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Table 3.1: Sources of start up capital for household-owned enterprises,
KHDS 2010
First most important Second most important
N % N %
Savings 669 50.19 75 6.20
Bank Loan 12 0.90 9 0.74
Informal Insurance Group Loan 49 3.68 10 0.83
Loan From Relatives 42 3.15 13 1.08
Loan From Friends 64 4.80 17 1.41
Gift From Relatives 124 9.30 20 1.65
Gift From Friends 18 1.35 4 0.33
Business Partner 10 0.75 2 0.17
Microfinance Institution 14 1.05 15 1.24
Sold assets or crops 200 15.00 0 0.00
Other (specify) 7 0.53 3 0.25
No Start Up Capital Needed 124 9.30 1,041 86.10
Total 1,333 100 1,209 100
ing out of poverty by 2010 (Table 3.2); however, 30 percent of the 1991 poor
remain poor in 2010.
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Table 3.2: Poverty transition matrix (%)
2004 2010
Poor Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor
1991 Poor 40.68 59.32 30.16 69.84
1991 Nonpoor 25.46 74.54 17.24 82.76
2004 Poor 39.12 60.88
2004 Nonpoor 17.47 82.53
Figure 3.1: Cumulative consumption 1991, 2004, 2010
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3.5 Empirical approach
My empirical approach is as follows: 1) define a set of livelihood strategies
based on household asset holdings and land and labor allocations using k-
medoids cluster analysis, 2) estimate returns to assets conditional on livelihood
choice using a second order approximation of a function relating consumption
to assets via fixed effects estimation, and 3) estimate welfare dynamics within
and between identified livelihood groups.
3.5.1 Identifying livelihoods
The task of identifying livelihood groups in a data driven manner poses several
challenges. The first challenge is to use a method that avoids arbitrary impo-
sition of empirically-unsupported assumptions on the number and content of
groups. Otherwise, it may be easy to find a sufficient number of livelihoods to
make the outer envelope of the livelihood set convex or an insufficient number
to make it non-convex. For this task, I use k-medoids cluster analysis (Kaufman
& Rousseeuw 1990) and rely on the gap statistic method (Tibshirani, Walther,
& Hastie 2001) to identify the optimal k in the data. The method of k-medoids
cluster analysis is more robust to outliers than k-means because within-cluster
dissimilarity is calculated via Manhattan distance as opposed to sum of squares.
K-medoids cluster analysis operates by identifying the k medoid observations,
or representative objects, that, once the other observations in the data set are as-
signed to closest representatives, best minimize dissimilarities in the resulting
clusters through an iterative algorithm (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990).
58
While many methods for the selection of k are available in the literature, most
are undefined for k=1; whereas the gap statistic method allows the data to iden-
tify a single cluster. Therefore, I rely on the gap statistic as an unbiased method
for the identification of the appropriate number of livelihood clusters. The gap
statistic identifies the optimal k as that for which the log of the within-cluster
dissimilarity measure is furthest (i.e., has the greatest gap) from the expected
log of the within-cluster dissimilarity measure for a null reference distribution
(Tibshirani et al. 2001). The gap statistic was developed by Tibshirani et al.
(2001) as an objective alternative to the commonly used elbow method heuris-
tic.
The cluster analysis procedure involves first normalizing each dataset, us-
ing the gap statistic method to identify the optimal number of clusters for each
dataset, and then assigning households to their clusters. The gap statistic proce-
dure (Tibshirani et al. 2001) entails iterating through the generation of k=1,...K-
medoids clusters (I select K=15), and calculating the within-cluster dissimilarity
measure for each k, Wk. The same procedure is applied to B bootstrap sam-
ples of the data (drawn uniformly from the support for each variable used in
the cluster analysis so as to create a null reference distribution), producing Wrkb.
The gap statistic for each k is then the distance between the true within-cluster
dissimilarity and the average within-cluster dissimilarity for the bootstrapped
samples,
gap(k) =
1
B
Σblog(Wrkb) − log(Wk) (3.12)
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The optimal k is selected where the gap of k is greater than that of k+1 minus
the standard deviation, sk, of k + 1,
gap(k) ≥ gap(k + 1) − sk+1 (3.13)
where the standard deviation for each k is calculated as the product of the
standard deviation of the bootstrap and the simulation error,
sk =
[ 1
B
Σb(log(Wrkb) −
1
B
Σblog(Wrkb))
2
] 1
2
√
1 +
1
B
(3.14)
The first term of Equation 3.14 is the standard deviation of the B boot-
strapped Wrkb; the second term accounts for the simulation error. In implement-
ing this approach, I follow the Tibshirani et al. (2001) option of using principle
components rotation for the generation of the uniform distribution of the null
reference set, as this proved robust to both k=1 and elongated clusters in Tibshi-
rani et al. (2001). I select the number of bootstraps as B=500.
With the appropriate k, denoted k∗, determined by the gap statistic, the k-
medoids clustering algorithm, partitioning around medoids (PAM), proceeds
as follows: it first selects in stepwise fashion an initial set of medoids, up to k∗,
that minimize dissimilarity in the resulting clusters; it then iteratively replaces
these medoids with observations one by one, stopping when the dissimilarity
measure cannot be further minimized. Formally, the program minimizes the
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objective function in Equation 4.21, by iteratively choosing cluster medoids ik
(Hastie et al. 2009),
minC,{ik}k∗1 Σ
k∗
1 ΣC(i)=kdiik (3.15)
where diik is the distance between the cluster medoid and the other members
of cluster C(i).
I implement the analysis in R using the cluster package by Maechler et al.
(2017) and select tuning parameters as specified above. The resulting clusters
are described below. Note that although this approach to identifying livelihoods
is data driven and not mechanically correlated with the measure of welfare in
this analysis (household consumption), it does not guarantee that cluster as-
signment is orthogonal to welfare.
The second challenge in identifying livelihood groupings in a data driven
manner is deciding on the appropriate set of variables to include in the analysis.
The number of clusters may be affected by the level of (dis)aggregegation in the
data; for example, should variables such as number of pigs and number of cows
be aggregated to tropical livestock units 4 (TLUs) or left as individual variables?
The literature 5 offers little guidance in these decisions.
4Tropical livestock units allow researchers to aggregate various livestock into a single, inter-
nationally comparable, cattle equivalency.
5There is one paper: using cluster analysis to identify livelihood strategies among rural
Kenyans, Brown et al. (2006) aggregate the available data into eleven different activities in-
cluding the production of annual food crops, perennial cash crops, coffee, tea, perennial forage
crops, improved and unimproved dairy cattle, non-dairy cattle, small ruminants and pigs, and
skilled and unskilled wage employment, reflecting a mix of productive assets and activities
as well as outputs; from these eleven activities they identify five different livelihoods using
k-means cluster analysis, having selected k = 5.
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So as to produce a set of livelihood strategies based on land and labor allo-
cation and asset holdings in line with the theoretical model described above, I
perform the cluster analysis over variables indicating household land and labor
allocation and productive assets only. In addition, so as to minimize researcher
influence in the final number of clusters and their contents, I keep the data as
granular as possible. This means, for example, that if the survey instrument asks
about the number of pigs and the number of cows owned by the household, I
use number of pigs and number of cows as separate variables in the analysis,
as opposed to aggregating livestock into TLUs. However, the available data set
comes with some limitations; for example, labor allocated to the production of
different types of crops or livestock cannot be observed. Note that the keeping
the data as granular as possible not only keeps the research enterprise honest,
it also provides the clustering algorithm with more information over which to
parse the data.
3.5.2 Estimating returns to assets by livelihood
To estimate returns to assets by livelihood, I estimate a second order Taylor se-
ries expansion of a function relating welfare (log per capita consumption expen-
ditures), e, to the productive asset variables, Ad, available in the data, with an
interaction term for livelihood strategy. I estimate individual, location, and time
fixed effects using the 1991 and 2004 waves of the KHDS to address unobserved
time invariant heterogeneity as well as annual trends that may be correlated
with welfare and the employment of particular assets or choice of livelihood
strategy. Identifying variation comes from changes in productive asset holdings
and livelihood strategies at the household level. A vector of time-varying indi-
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vidual and household characteristics, Xht, including age and squared age, mar-
ital status, farm inputs, and the number of businesses the household operates
is included to control for time varying observables. Note that location fixed ef-
fects will not capture unobserved location-specific heterogeneity for those who
moved out of the Kagera region by 2004, due to the fact that non-Kagera loca-
tions are not observed in the first wave.
The productive assets used in the estimation6 include labor hours per week,
land area, the log value of business assets, total TLU, and years of education.
In Equation 4.25, i indexes individual, t indexes time, l indexes location, and d
indexes the productive assets included in the estimation.
eitl = Σ5dβdAitdl +
1
2
Σ5dβddA
2
itdl + Σ
5
dΣ
5
jβd jAitdlAit jl + βxXit+
Σ5dγdAitdlLit +
1
2
Σ5dγddA
2
itdlLit + Σ
5
dΣ
5
jγd jlAitdlAit jlLit + γxXitLit + wl + αi + ψt + itl
(3.16)
With the resulting coefficient estimates, I trace out the marginal returns by
livelihood strategy for each asset over its support,
m(Ar) = βˆr + βˆrrAr + Σ4s βˆrsA¯s + γˆr + γˆrrArL + Σ
4
s γˆrsA¯sL (3.17)
where r indexes the support of the asset of interest and A¯ indicates that a
6In contrast with the cluster analysis approach, I aggregate assets into meaningful categories
here.
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variable is being held at its mean. Standard errors are produced using the delta
method.
If the data are consistent with a multiple equilibria welfare dynamics sce-
nario, we should observe the marginal returns to assets differing by livelihood
strategy such that the livelihoods requiring greater fixed costs offer higher re-
turns to the same asset holdings, producing locally increasing returns in any
shift from a low return livelihood to a higher return livelihood (i.e., generating
local non-convexities in the outer envelope of the livelihood choice set).
3.5.3 Livelihood group welfare dynamics
I examine livelihood group welfare dynamics between 1991 and 2004 and be-
tween 2004 and 2010 to observe whether initial welfare status determines long
run dynamics both within and across livelihoods. I use the flexible fractional
polynomial estimator (Royston & Altman 1994, StataCorp 2009) to graph these
dynamics, regressing logged consumption in the later period on that of the ear-
lier period.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Identifying livelihoods
The cluster analysis is performed over a set of 99 (94) variables for the 1991
(2004) data set; these variables capture labor allocation across various wage,
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small enterprise, and farm activities; land allocation across cash, staple, and
sustenance crops as available in each data set; stocks of land, livestock, farm,
financial (including unearned income), and business assets; and expenditures
on hired labor and farm inputs. They also capture human capital assets in terms
of education and health. Using the gap statistic method, a single livelihood was
identified in the 1991 data and two livelihood clusters were identified in the
2004 data. From Figure 3.2, we can see that there is a single cluster (the full data
set) in the 1991 data and that there are two well-defined clusters in the 2004 data,
though greater than two, less well-defined, clusters or subclusters might also be
identified.7 Summary statistics for, and a plot of, the 2004 clusters are available
in Appendix Table B.1 and Figure B.1. The cluster plot in Figure B.1, presenting
the projection of the data on to its first two principle components, suggests that
the clusters are well separated. Descriptions of each of the identified livelihood
strategies follow.
The two livelihood clusters that emerge in the 2004 data might be best re-
ferred to by their most salient characteristics: the 2,216 households in cluster
one have, on average, larger household sizes, larger land holdings, greater live-
stock assets, and allocate more land to every crop (excepting rice) than do those
in cluster two (Appendix Table B.1). Therefore Ill refer to cluster one as the
farm-based livelihood strategy. The 558 households in cluster two have higher
education, allocate more labor to wage labor (excepting farm wage labor) and
non-farm self-employment, and hold greater non-farm business assets; there-
fore, Ill refer to cluster two as the wage labor/entrepreneur livelihood strategy.
7As a robustness check on the stability of the clusters, I rely on the boostrapped Jaccard
coefficient approach described in Hennig (2007). The Jaccard coefficient offers a measure of
the similarity of cluster membership across bootstrapped clusterings of the data. The approach
identified two clusters with Jaccard coefficients of 0.987 and 0.949 across 100 bootstrap samples
of the data, indicating that the identified clusters are a highly stable structure in the data.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal number of clusters 1991 (N = 915, v = 99) and 2004
(N = 2774, v = 94) using the gap statistic
(a) 1991 (b) 2004
Compared with households in the farm-based livelihood group, the wage
labor/entrepreneur households allocate more hours per week to wage labor in
skilled, professional, or services industries; they also allocate more labor to self-
employment as merchants, in transportation, in services and other skilled in-
dustries (Appendix Table B.1). While they have many fewer livestock, land, and
other farm assets than the farmers, the wage labor/entrepreneurs have much
larger business asset holdings: the total value of their business buildings is 2.5
times greater than that of the farmers and the value of their business vehicle and
equipment assets is approximately twice as large. However, there is no differ-
ence in the total number of businesses operated by household members between
the two livelihood strategiesin both livelihoods, households own, on average,
half of a business. Meanwhile, the farm-based households allocate more labor
to farm and livestock activities. They hold on average 3.6 acres of farmland as
compared with the 0.14 acres of the wage labor/entrepreneur group. They also
own more sheep/goats, cattle, pigs, and other livestock.
In terms of unearned income and financial assets, the wage la-
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bor/entrepreneurs have no pension, no dowry, and do not play the lottery, per-
haps reflecting the fact that these households have younger 8 heads of house-
hold (32 years old as compared with 44 years old in the farmer group) and are
less likely to be married (51 percent as compared with 79 percent in the farmer
group). On the other hand, the wage labor/entrepreneurs receive much greater
income from interest on savings (7.4 times greater), sale of durables (4.9 times
greater), and receive larger remittances (1.9 times greater) than do the farmers.
The average household size in the wage labor/entrepreneur group is 3
compared with that of 5 for the farmer group. While they have fewer labor-
ers per household, the wage labor/entrepreneur households have higher hu-
man capital in terms of education and health. Households in the wage la-
bor/entrepreneur livelihood group have a higher share of household members
who have completed secondary school (18 percent of the household compared
with 4 percent in the farmer group), advanced (3 percent compared with 0 in
the farmer group), and university (1 percent compared with 0) degrees. They
also enjoy slightly higher health: on average, 53 percent of household members
reported being free of illness or injury over the past 4 weeks as compared with
48 percent of household members in the farmer group.
Although not included as variables in the cluster analysis, consumption lev-
els, poverty status, and moved or migrated statuses differ by livelihood. The
wage labor households have 2.5 times higher consumption than the farm house-
holds and are much less likely to be poor (9 percent compared with 51 percent).
A greater share of the wage labor/entrepreneur household has moved from the
original homestead (50 percent compared with 21 percent) and the household
8Neither age nor marital status variables were used for the clustering; however, it is instruc-
tive to compare these demographic data across clusters.
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is more likely to have migrated out of their original sampling cluster (84 per-
cent compared with 43 percent). This suggests that the wage laborers and en-
trepreneurs are able to earn a higher return on their labor and or entrepreneurial
activities because of migration, education, both, or an omitted variable corre-
lated with both consumption and livelihood. Unobservable individual hetero-
geneity, such as inherent ability, will be addressed below via fixed effects esti-
mation of the returns to assets.
Looking back to 1991 9 asset holdings based on households 2004 identified
livelihood strategies, differences between those households that eventually en-
ter the wage labor/entrepreneur livelihood and those that do not are not great,
as we might expect given that cluster analysis was not able to parse the 1991
data. However, we do see the following: the 139 households in 1994 that grow
into the 558 wage labor/entrepreneur households by 2004 had slightly higher
consumption (1.2 times greater), were slightly less poor (42 percent compared
with 49 percent), had slightly higher shares of primary (65 percent compared
with 61 percent) and secondary (5 percent as compared with 3 percent) edu-
cated households members, and slightly greater health (93 percent compared
with 91 percent). Although statistically significant, these differences are all very
small in magnitude. We also see slight differences in the number of businesses
owned (greater in wage labor/entrepreneur group), the amount of time allo-
cated to farm and fish wage labor (smaller in wage labor/entrepreneur group)
and factory wage labor (greater in wage labor/entrepreneur group), and alloca-
tion of land area to certain crops.
The only large-in-magnitude differences are the value of business build-
9The 2004 data are weighted by their 1991 quantities so as to not spuriously find significant
differences. Table not presented but available on request.
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ing assets (3.2 times greater in wage labor/entrepreneur group), land holdings
(0.55 acres smaller in wage labor/entrepreneur group), and financial assetsthe
wage labor/entrepreneurs have three times as great value from ROSCA par-
ticipation and two times greater value of other non-labor income. The wage
labor/entrepreneurs also have 1.6 fewer per capita on farm labor hours and 0.3
fewer per capita herding hours per week than do the farm households. Note
that own farm labor hours are the only labor activity to which households allo-
cate significant amounts of time in 1991 whereas in 2004 allocated labor hours
are more diversified, especially in the wage labor/entrepreneur group.
Overall, the evolution of small initial differences in asset holdings in 1991
into larger differences 13 years later suggests bifurcating welfare dynamics.
However, although the cluster analysis identifies only two livelihood strategies
in the data, and although they can be described within the generic farm and
off-farm categories, the composition of the two livelihood strategies identified
in the data show within-livelihood diversification. In fact, the diversification
within livelihoods observed in this Kagera-specific sample has been observed
in Tanzania more broadly: in a study of occupational choice using nationally
representative data from 2010-2011 Tanzania, McCoullough (2016) finds that, in
response to productivity gains in both sectors, households will diversify into
self- and wage-employment without leaving farming. Therefore, comparison
of the identified livelihoods, and consideration of the assets and allocations of
which they are composed, suggests incremental and surmountable shifts within
livelihoods. The question remains as to whether shifts between livelihoods are
also incremental and surmountable.
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3.6.2 Heterogenous and locally increasing returns
Marginal returns in consumption to each asset by livelihood strategy are shown
in Figures 3.3 through 3.7 where the marginal returns are estimated at unit incre-
ments along the support of each asset, holding all other assets at their means.
Below each marginal return figure is a kernel density plot showing the data
density dissagregated by livelihood. The assets that offer statistically discern-
able returns by livelihood strategy are business assets (Figure 3.3), labor assets
(Figure 3.4), and human capital assets (Figure 3.7).
Marginal returns to business assets (Figure 3.3) are increasing for individuals
in farm households while they are indistinguishable from a flat line (constant re-
turns) for the wage labor/entrepreneur group. However, the returns are higher
for the wage labor/entrepreneurs except at the tail end of the asset distribu-
tion where returns for the two groups appear to converge. Individuals in the
wage labor/entrepreneur livelihood enjoy greater returns to each hour of labor
(Figure 3.4) than do the farmers.
While it appears that those in the wage labor/entrepreneur livelihood ex-
perience increasing returns to their land holdings (Figure 3.5), these estimates
are based on extremely sparse data, as reflected by the density plot below the
figure. Where the data are most dense, there is no distinguishable difference in
returns to land holdings by livelihood strategy. Marginal returns to livestock
holdings by livelihood strategy (Figure 3.6) are also statistically indistinguish-
able from one another. Returns to human capital assets in terms of years of
education are greater in the wage labor/entrepreneur labor group (Figure 3.7);
returns are slightly increasing for both livelihoods across the distribution. The
data are dense at seven years of education, indicating the completion of primary
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school.
Figure 3.3: Marginal returns to business assets by livelihood strategy
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Figure 3.4: Marginal returns to labor by livelihood strategy
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Figure 3.5: Marginal returns to land holdings by livelihood strategy
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Figure 3.6: Marginal returns to livestock holdings by livelihood strategy
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Figure 3.7: Marginal returns to education by livelihood strategy
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Overall, the estimated marginal returns to assets by livelihood strategy sug-
gest that, holding all else constant, if households could move from the farm
to the wage labor/entrepreneur livelihood, they would experience greater re-
turns to their business, labor, and human capital assets. However, we know
from both the livelihood summary statistics as well as other research (Beegle
et al. 2011, Christiaensen et al. 2013, and De Weerdt & Hirvonen 2016) that a
great deal of migration is also occuring between 1991 and 2004 and that mi-
gration is correlated with the change from a farm to an off-farm livelihood.
Therefore, the role of migration as an additional technology in this setting must
also be considered. To do so, I treat migration as a technology that can inter-
act with the identified livelihoods, estimating Equation 4.25 with three liveli-
hoods instead of the original two: Remain & Farm, Move & Farm, and Move
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& Wage/Entrepreneur. There is an insufficient number of observations of Re-
main & Wage/Entrepreneur to produce estimates for this group. The results are
presented in Figures 3.8 through 3.10.
The returns to assets for those who move and switch livelihoods (Move &
Wage/Entrepreneur) are greater than those who remain in farming, regardless
of whether or not they have moved. Comparing the estimated returns to as-
sets by livelihood (Figures 3.3 through 3.7) with those interacted with migration
(Figures 3.8 through 3.10) suggests that most of the differences in returns are
driven by livelihood status and not by migration alone. However, migration
plays an important role.
Altogether, these findings support those of Beegle et al. (2011), Christiaensen
et al. (2013), and De Weerdt & Hirvonen (2016) in showing that migration has
played an important role in the increasing welfares of the Kagera households,
regardless of livelihood strategy, and in showing that the combined strategy
of migration plus adoption of an off-farm livelihood offers the highest returns.
To return to the poor people or poor places question, these results show that
while returns are not determined uniquely by geography, it clearly plays a role.
In addition, these findings add nuance to those of Young (2013) who saw dif-
ferentiated returns due to regional (rural/urban) demand for skill but did not
consider livelihoods.
As with Young (2013), Gollin et al (2014), Herrendorf & Schoellman (2018),
and Lakagos & Waugh (2013), my findings are consistent with a selection story
in that those with higher education are in the off-farm livelihood. The long
panel data as well as the spell length between panel waves means that I may be
observing the return to households’ livelihood choices following a failed liveli-
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hood switch or a failed migration attempt from which the household has since
returned (to initial livelihood or location). In addition, note that household com-
position is changing over the duration of the panel as households marry and
move. Household fixed effects allow me to control for ”dynasty” effects such as
a family having a greater initial endowment of intelligence, skill, or other un-
observable resources in the first wave; however, they do not provide me with
sufficient identification to claim that the same, e.g., labor assets would realize
higher returns were the household to switch livelihood or location (or both).
Figure 3.8: Marginal returns to business assets by migration status
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Figure 3.9: Marginal returns to labor by migration status
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Figure 3.10: Marginal returns to education by migration status
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Although we see results consistent with locally increasing returns between
livelihoods, these are a necessary but not sufficient condition for multiple equi-
libria welfare dynamics. Therefore, Ill next estimate welfare dynamics by liveli-
hood strategy.
3.6.3 Livelihood group welfare dynamics
Although the average household in the data is on a non-poor consumption dy-
namic path (Figure 3.11; horizontal and vertical lines indicate the poverty line),
those households adopting the wage labor/entrepreneur strategy in 2004 enjoy
a higher equilibrium in 2004 (Figure 3.11a) and 2010 (Figure 3.11b) than those
79
who do not. Whether considering mean population dynamics or livelihood spe-
cific dynamics, neither single nor multiple equilibria poverty traps emerge in
this setting.
In comparing the 1991 to 2004 livelihood specific welfare dynamics (Figure
3.12a) with those of 2004 to 2010 (Figure 3.12b), we see conditional convergence
give way to convergence. The structural transformation literature suggests that
this convergence is due to increasing returns to factors in the low return sector,
freeing up resources for other sectors (Timmer 1988, 2002; Gollin 2014). Unfor-
tunately, due to data limitations, it is not possible to assess whether the relative
welfare increase by 2010 of those households in the farm livelihood group in
2004 is due to increasing returns, livelihood transitions, or other causes.
Figure 3.11: Mean consumption dynamics (a) 1991 to 2004 (b) 2004 to 2010
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Figure 3.12: Consumption dynamics by 2004 livelihood strategy (a) 1991
to 2004 (b) 2004 to 2010
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3.7 Conclusion
Using a flexible, theoretically grounded, data driven approach to the identifica-
tion of livelihood strategies based on assets and their allocations, I observe the
emergence of an off-farm livelihood between 1991 and 2004. Estimated returns
to assets differ by livelihood, suggesting locally increasing returns in the move
from one livelihood strategy to another; however, as with the rest of the liter-
ature (Young 2013, Gollin et al 2014, Herrendorf & Schoellman 2018, Lakagos
& Waugh 2013), the greater returns are likely due to selection. While I am not
able to identify the causes of the consumption gap, my findings add additional
support to the literature on this phenomena in that my findings emerged from
the data with minimal assumptions. Additionally, my findings suggest that
livelihood change plays a greater role in increasing consumption than does geo-
graphic change. The asset content of each of the identified livelihood strategies
is diverse, suggesting mobility. According to the observed welfare dynamics,
neither livelihood group is trapped in poverty. However, when heterogeneity
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in livelihood strategies is allowed for in the estimation of welfare dynamics,
conditional convergence is observed. By 2010 the farm livelihood group has
caught up to the wage/entrepreneur group, suggesting convergence in welfare.
Despite beginning with a flexible framework and employing a data driven strat-
egy, findings support many of the stylized facts of the structural transformation
literature such as the emergence of two sectors, sector-differentiated returns to
labor and other factors, and catch up in the low return sector.
This exercise – the estimation of welfare dynamics over heterogeneous liveli-
hoods that have been identified in a data driven manner – and its findings (farm
and off-farm livelihoods, locally increasing returns, conditional convergence,
and convergence) have several important implications. First, the evolution from
a single livelihood in 1991 to two livelihoods in 2004 suggests that there exist
serious limitations to the estimation of welfare dynamics over a single asset or
just those assets that are observed to play a large role in household livelihoods
at baseline, as is done in much of the welfare dynamics literature. For exam-
ple, if one were to estimate returns to only land and livestock assets between
1991 and 2004, it would appear as though the wage labor/entrepreneur group
was earning much higher returns on much smaller asset holdings than the farm
group, when in fact they are relying on returns to other productive assets such
as human capital and business investments. Likewise, welfare dynamics esti-
mated over land and livestock assets alone would be extremely misleading for
the wage labor/entrepreneur group, as holdings collapse to near zero for these
households; we might spuriously conclude that the wage labor/entrepreneur
group is trapped in poverty when in fact they’ve switched to a (more lucrative)
livelihood that relies on a different set of assets.10 The analysis also suggests
10Additional limitations of asset based welfare analysis in the Kagera data have been demon-
strated by De Weerdt (2010), who used quantitative and qualitative evidence to explore why
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that estimation of welfare dynamics at population means, without allowing for
heterogeneity to emerge, masks policy relevant findings. Whether subsets of
households are facing poverty traps, conditional convergence, or eventual con-
vergence, so long as we’re able to observe their plights and prospects appropri-
ate policies and interventions can be designed to meet their needs.
How can we reconcile the observed differences in returns to assets between
livelihoods in the (likely) presence of market failures – i.e., the two conditions
that give rise to poverty traps – with a failure to observe multiple welfare equi-
libria in this setting? We have seen that new livelihoods can emerge over time,
meaning that even if the livelihood choice set is non-convex, it is not fixed.
Moreover, the content of each livelihood strategy is diverse, suggesting incre-
mental movement within, and possibly between, livelihoods. We also see con-
vergence in returns to assets once migration is accounted for in the estimation.
As an additional technology, migration increases returns to a livelihood because
individuals are moving to more connected locations in terms of roads, markets,
and other infrastructure, as observed by De Weerdt (2010), Beegle et al. (2011),
and Christiaensen et al. (2013). In addition, market failures are household spe-
cific and a matter of degree; as a household moves to a more connected area,
that household may also be less constrained by market failures.
and how individuals deviated from their asset-based growth path trajectories. Through focus
group discussions, De Weerdt (2010) finds that those whose asset growth between 1991 and 2004
exceedes their predicted asset growth are more likely to have diversified their farming activi-
ties (food crops, cash crops, and livestock), expanded their land holdings, and diversified into
non-farm activities (national and international food trade, small shop ownership). Those whose
asset growth underperformed relative to their predicted growth were more likely to have expe-
rienced major illness or death in the family. He ascribes the failure of his predictive model to: a
failure to account for occupational choices (i.e. diversification decisions), shocks (i.e. death and
illness, price shocks, weather shocks), unobservables (social capital in terms of networks and
trust, experience in trade, and exposure to life outside their village), and model specification er-
ror (omitted interactions between village remoteness and initial conditions), several of which he
is able to identify through qualitative analysis. While his comments are focused on the Kagera
data, De Weerdt’s (2010) insights on the limitations of asset based welfare analysis apply to such
analyses in general.
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The absence of a multiple equilibria welfare dynamics in this setting – where
heterogeneity of welfare and conditional convergence are observed – has impli-
cations for and raises important questions about appropriate anti-poverty in-
tervention points. It is generally challenging to distinguish cases of conditional
convergence from a poverty trap (Ghatak 2015, Barrett & Carter 2013), and con-
vergence may be so slow as to make the promise of convergence practically
meaningless, as eventual attainment of a high equilibrium is little consolation
to households facing long run poverty and inequality. There is a long-standing
debate in the academic (and public) anti-poverty programming discourse as to
whether intervention stifles local growth and innovation, leaving households,
regions, and nations dependent upon the benevolence of donors (Easterly 2006)
or is absolutely necessary to assist households in reaching higher, long-run
growth paths (Sachs 2005). A productive way forward may be to assess the het-
erogeneous treatment effects of anti-poverty programs using innovative meth-
ods developed by Athey and co-authors (Athey & Imbens 2016, Wager & Athey
2017); this is an objective of my future work.
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CHAPTER 4
RISK, RETURNS, ANDWELFARE
∗This chapter was written in collaboration with Leah Bevis
4.1 Introduction
A positive correlation between the riskiness and returns of households’ asset
portfolios and their initial asset endowments is often taken for granted in de-
velopment economics, especially in settings where financial market failures are
likely (Barrett et al. 2016). The relationship among risk, returns, and welfare has
important implications for the reproduction of inequality and persistent poverty
and therefore is critical to understand for effective anti-poverty policy making.
If a household with a low initial asset endowment is constrained to low return
economic activities (or, similarily, if higher return activities come with greater
risk and household risk preferences induce the household to chose the low risk,
low return activities), then not only will that household remain poor, but the
gap between those with a low endowment and those with a high endowment
will only grow overtime, meaning growing inequality.
The relationship among risk, returns, and welfare is particularly salient in
the case of the Sub-Saharan African household for which multiple household
specific market failures, including insufficient access to credit and insurance
markets, can compound and for which proximity to asset-based poverty thresh-
olds (e.g. sufficient land holdings to make investments in inputs and mech-
anization economically viable, sufficient herd size to sustain transhumance)
might produce risk seeking or risk avoiding behaviors as households either
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seek to move above or remain above an asset threshold (Barrett et al. 2016,
Barrett et al. 2006). Moreover, the relationship has important implications for
popular interventions such as index insurance, microfinance, and social safety
nets – interventions designed to correct the sort of market failures that can in-
duce households to choose low-risk low-return activities despite the existence
of more lucrative options.
While there is a lot of theoretical support for the existence of a positive corre-
lation among among risk, returns, and welfare (Eswaran & Kotwal 1990, Deaton
1991, Zimmerman & Carter 2003), empirical evidence is thin. Most available
empirical evidence considers agricultural (Di Falco & Chavas 2006, 2009) or
livestock portfolios only, or a combination of the two (e.g. Rosensweig & Bin-
swanger 1993, Dercon 1996) and cannot account for efforts to mitigate agricul-
tural risk via off-farm diversification. In addition, most theoretical and empiri-
cal treatments of the relationship among initial welfare, risk, and returns stop at
the mean-variance approach to portfolio choice (Meyer 1987, Markowitz 1952,
Just & Pope 1979) and therefore either fail to account for, or assume away, the
possible influence of downside risk (skewness), implicitly placing strong as-
sumptions on risk preferences (Chavas 2004).
Do initial 1 asset holdings determine the riskiness (both upside and down-
side risk) and expected returns of a household’s asset portfolio? We investi-
gate this question in the increasingly economically diversified setting of Tanza-
nia using unsupervised learning methods to identify the set of productive as-
set portfolios available in the Tanzanian economy and Antle’s (1983) moments
approach to estimate the first three conditional moments (mean, variance, and
skewness) of the returns to those asset portfolios. We then non-parametrically
1Here we mean ”initial” in the sense of initial conditions in a first order Markov process.
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estimate the relationship among the conditional moments as well as the rela-
tionship between the value of initial asset holdings and the estimated moments
for each portfolio.
In addition, assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), we estimate
the risk premium associated with each portfolio. The risk premium is defined
as the amount of money one would be willing to pay to insure against risk or,
similarly, the amount one would be willing to pay to hold the source of random
variation at its mean (DiFalco & Chavas 2009).
In subsequent sections we situate our research question in the theoretical and
emprical literature on the relationship among risk, returns, and welfare, develop
a theoretical model and derive the risk premium, and explain the methods, data,
and results.
4.2 Background
Current thinking about the relationship among risk, returns, and welfare in set-
tings of multiple financial market failures – in particular the idea that, absent
credit and insurance markets, initial endowments may determine households’
access to high risk, high return assets–draws on a long theoretical and empirical
literature. Eswaran & Kotwal (1990) provide a theoretical model demonstrating
that, even where risk preferences are identical, differences in risk behavior can
emerge from differences in access to credit. Deaton (1991) shows that in the face
of income risk and borrowing constraints, assets serve as a buffer stock and are
used to smooth consumption.
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Building on Deaton’s (1991) theoretical work, Dercon (1996) shows empiri-
cally that rural Tanzanian households that have built up a large buffer stock of
liquid assets, such as livestock, are more likely to undertake high risk activities.
Rosenzweig & Binswanger (1993) find that farming households in regions of In-
dia with greater rainfall variation choose asset portfolios that are less sensitive
to rainfall risk and therefore offer lower returns. Dercon (1998) shows through
simulation and empirical estimates that rural Tanzanian households that have
greater initial endowments are more likely to enter into the high-risk, high-
return activity of cattle raising as compared with relatively lower risk, lower
return activities such as growing crops or wage labor. Carter (1997) finds a high
correlation between low initial land endowments and effective risk exposure in
Burkina Faso, suggesting both that households with lower endownments will
be less inclined to adopt new technologies and that asset inequality will grow.
Zimmerman & Carter (2003) build on Dercon (1996, 1998) by allowing for divis-
ible assets (i.e. non-livestock assets such as grain and land) and endogenizing
asset price risk in the portfolio selection choice. Using parameters from rural
households in Burkina Faso, Zimmerman & Carter (2003) show, via simulation,
that the correlation between initial wealth and return on investments is a conse-
quence of asset-based risk coping in an environment where insurance and sav-
ings mechanisms are not available. They also demonstrate that this relationship
produces self-perpetuating inequality and poverty.
Both theoretical and emprical analyses of welfare dynamics suggest that the
relationship between risk and welfare may not be strictly monotonic. Barrett et
al. (2006), Carter & Barrett (2006), Lybbert & Barrett (2011), Carter & Lybbert
(2012), and Lybbert etal (2013) show that just below a dynamic asset-based wel-
fare threshold (also known as the ”Micawber threshold,” the dynamic threshold
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at which high and low welfare equilibria bifurcate) agents should be more risk-
seeking on the chance that a positive random draw will push them above the
threshold, while those just above the threshold should be more risk averse (and
more inclined to asset smooth than to consumption smooth) on the chance that
a negative random draw will push them below the threshold.
While the theoretical literature has established a relationship among risk,
returns, and initial asset-based welfare (Eswaran & Kotwal 1990, Deaton 1991,
Zimmerman & Carter 2003), the empirical literature has been constrained to
analyses of agricultural and livestock portfolios (Di Falco & Chavas 2006, 2009,
Rosensweig & Binswanger 1993, Dercon 1996) and therefore cannot account for
the role of off-farm diversification in risk management. In addition, extension
of the analysis beyond the mean-variance approach to portfolio choice (Meyer
1987, Markowitz 1952, Just & Pope 1979) to consideration of downside risk
(skewness) is important, as variance alone does not allow one to distinguish be-
tween upside and downside risk (Chavas 2004, Di Falco & Chavas 2006, 2009).
As an example, in an analysis of crop biodiversity, Di Falco & Chavas (2009)
find that biodiversity and soil fertility increase risk but decrease downside risk.
Had their analysis only considered the second moment of the yield distribution,
it would have found that biodiversity and soil fertility were welfare decreasing
for a risk-averse farmer when in fact these inputs reduce the farmer’s exposure
to downside risk.
The contribution of this paper is to move beyond the agricultural in-
puts/livestock assets models as well as beyond the mean-variance approach
to asset portfolio selection to empirically examine the extent to which the mean,
variance, and skewness of returns to a diverse array of asset holdings is cor-
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related with initial asset endowments, and therefore the extent to which the
heterogeneity of initial endowments may perpetuate poverty and inequality.
4.3 Theory
Without an ability to control for all market constraints, such as a lack of access
to credit or insurance, it is not possible to disentangle risk preferences from ob-
served risk behavior. Indeed, this is the finding in Eswaran & Kotwal (1990);
even where preferences are identical, household-specific capital and credit mar-
ket failures may heterogeneously impact risk premia and therefore the risk be-
havior of households. Likewise, Lybbert etal (2013) find that observed risk be-
havior may be a response to wealth dynamics that are observable to the house-
hold but not to the econometrician, resulting in the econometric misattribution
of observed risk behavior to risk preferences. Therefore, the focus of this paper
will be on observed risk behavior in terms of the riskiness of households’ se-
lected asset portfolios. Initially, we will make no assumptions about household
risk preferences. To parameterize the risk premium, we will assume constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), which has the nice feature that it allows for de-
creasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Following Rosenzweig & Binswanger (1993), Chavas (2004), and Di Falco &
Chavas (2006, 2009), let a household have asset stock vector xt at time t, xt ≥ 0
(let bolding indicate vectors throughout). The household enjoys the returns,
g(xt , zt , vt), as a function of the household’s assets, other productive inputs, zt ,
zt ≥ 0, and a vector of random variables, vt , that includes such sources of ran-
dom variation as rainfall, sales prices unknown to the household at the time of
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the productive allocation of its assets, and other sources of variation in returns.
One should think of g(.) as the set of livelihoods or technologies available in the
economy with which households can derive a flow of profits from their stock
of productive assets. The household also realizes expenses associated with pur-
chased inputs at price, pzt. The net profit function vector is,
Πt = g(xt , zt , vt) − p′zt zt (4.1)
Note that we are assuming away exogenous unearned income, as our focus
here is on returns to asset holdings and investments. We are also assuming
away implicit rental payments on owned assets.
The household’s ability to access credit each period is a function, ηt(xt) of its
asset holdings in each period. In the context of this model, where it is assumed
that savings are in terms of productive assets only, one can think of ηt(xt) as a
liquidity function, as it might involve collateralizing assets so as to access credit,
reselling assets, and dissaving. The household can also invest in additional as-
sets, It (denominated in the same units as the assets vector, xt). Therefore the
household’s budget constraint is,
Ct ≤ Πt + ηt(xt) − It (4.2)
where Ct represents the household’s consumption in period t, Ct ≥ 0.
The household realizes costs (or gains) each period due to the depreciation
(or appreciation)2 of its asset holdings, δ ∈ (−1, 1), where negative values cap-
2For example, assets such as a tractor may depreciate in value while assets such as livestock
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ture asset appreciation and postive values capture asset depreciation. Therefore,
the household’s asset stock evolves following a deterministic law of motion,
xt+1 = (1 − δ)xt + It (4.3)
Let the household’s consumption risk preferences be represented by a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(Ct). Let the utility function be addi-
tively separable over time with ρ ∈ [0, 1] representing the household’s discount
factor. We use a consumption-based (as opposed to an income-based or termi-
nal wealth-based) model of economic behavior under risk in aknowledgement
that consumption and production decisions are generally non-separable in the
setting under study. The household’s objective is to maximize the expected util-
ity of consumption subject to the given budget, asset accumulation, and non-
negativity constraints,
MaxIt ,Ct ,xt+1,ztΣ
T
t=0ρ
t
{
EU(Ct)
}
(4.4)
s.t.
Ct ≤ g(xt , zt , vt) − p′zt zt + ηt(xt) − It (4.5)
xt+1 = (1 − δ)xt + It (4.6)
xt+1, zt,Ct ≥ 0 (4.7)
xt ≥ 0, given (4.8)
may beget more livestock and therefore increase in value.
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For simplicity, let Ct be a scalar capturing the monetary value of all con-
sumed goods, whether produced or purchased and let limc→0U′(C) = ∞, mean-
ing Ct = 0 will never be optimal (and we therefore do not need to address the
non-negativity constraint on consumption; it will not bind). Substituting the
budget constraint into the asset law of motion, the remaining choice variables
are Ct, xt+1, and zt. The Lagrangean expression of the problem is,
L = ΣTt=0ρ
t
{
EU(Ct) + λt
[
(1 − δ)′xt+
g(xt , zt , vt) − p′zt zt + ηt(xt) −Ct − xt+1
]
+ γt+1xt+1 + ζtzt
} (4.9)
The first order conditions (letting subscripts indicate derivatives) are,
∂L
∂Ct
: EUCt − λt = 0 (4.10)
∂L
∂xt+1
: −ρtλt + ρt+1λt+1[(1 − δ) + gxt+1(xt+1, zt+1, vt+1)
+ηt+1,xt+1(xt+1)
]
+ ρtγt+1 = 0
(4.11)
∂L
∂zt
: ρtλt
[
gzt(xt , zt , vt) − pzt
]
+ ρtζt = 0 (4.12)
With K-T conditions,
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γt+1xt+1 = 0
γt+1 ≥ 0
xt+1 ≥ 0
λt ≥ 0
ζt zt = 0
zt ≥ 0
ζt ≥ 0
(4.13)
Simplifying and combining Equations 4.10 and 4.11 offers the Euler equa-
tion, relating consumption in time t to that in time t + 1,
EUCt = ρEUCt+1
[
(1 − δ) + gxt+1(xt+1, zt+1, vt+1) + ηt+1,xt+1(xt+1)
]
+ γt+1 (4.14)
Equation 4.14 tells us that, where the Lagrange multiplier for the liquidity
constraint γt+1 is non binding (γt+1 = 0), the marginal utility of current consump-
tion over the first three moments of the consumption distribution must equal
the discounted marginal utility of the first three moments of the next period’s
consumption distribution, moderated by the marginal return of next period’s
assets. However if γt+1 > 0, the marginal utility will be greater at time t than
at t + 1 (Deaton 1991, Dercon 1996, 1998), meaning that the household will con-
sume rather than invest, dissaving all its assets. Because g(xt , zt , vt) is a function
of household asset holdings, inputs, and exogenous variation, if the liquidity
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constraint binds and there are any barriers to entry to a particular livelihood or
technology, e.g. a minimum asset threshold for participation in a given liveli-
hood, then we would expect to find not only different optimal asset accumu-
lation paths based on initial asset holdings but also different conditional con-
sumption distributions among households.
Following Antle (1987), Chavas (2004), and Di Falco & Chavas (2006, 2009),
a local approximation of the household’s risk premium can be derived from the
household’s utility function over the first three moments of the distribution of
the utility of consumption. Inclusion of the third moment, skewness, represents
a departure from the mean-variance portfolio choice literature, which assumes
either that the household has no preferences over the third moment or that the
third moment is zero (Meyer 1987, Chavas 2004). Inclusion of the third moment
relaxes this assumption, allowing downside risk to play a role in determining
the household’s utility of consumption. Let the utility function, U(C) be thrice
continuously differentiable. And let E(C), V(C), and S (C) indicate the mean,
variance, and skewness of the utility of consumption distribution, respectively.
To derive the risk premium, set the utility function equal to the certainty
equivalent,
U(C) = U(E(C) − R) (4.15)
and take a third order Taylor Series expansion of U(C) with respect to C, letting
Ud indicate the dth derivative of the utility function,
U(C) = U(E(C)) + U1E(C − E(C)) + 1
2
U2E(C − E(C)2 + 1
6
U3E(C − E(C))3 (4.16)
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Take the expectation,
EU(C) = EU(E(C)) + U1(C − E(C)) + 1
2
U2(C − E(C))2 + 1
6
U3(C − E(C))3 (4.17)
Because E(C − E(C)) = 0, E(C − E(C))2 = V(C), and E(C − E(C))3 = S (C), we can
simplify to,
EU(C) = EU(E(C)) +
1
2
U2V(C) +
1
6
U3S (C) (4.18)
Take a first order Taylor series expansion of U(E(C) − R) with respect to R
U(E(C) − R) = U(E(C)) − U1R (4.19)
Setting the two results equal (i.e., substituting them back into the risk premium
definition in Equation 4.15) and simplifying, we have an expression for the
household’s risk premium,
R = −1
2
U2
U1
V(C) − 1
6
U3
U1
S (C) (4.20)
In Equation 4.20, −U2U1 is the Arrow-Pratt (AP) coefficient of risk aversion; it
captures the proportionality between the risk premium and the variance of risk
in the neighborhood of the riskless case, i.e., where R=0 (Chavas 2004). Likewise,
−U3U1 is the coefficient of downside (DS) risk aversion; it captures the proportion-
ality between the risk premium and the skewness of risk in the neighborhood
of the riskless case (Menezes etal 1980).
With a few assumptions, the variance and skewness of the consumption dis-
tribution, V(C) and S (C), can be estimated from the data (Antle 1983); this pro-
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cedure will be detailed in the methods section. Identifying and/or estimating
appropriate values for AP and DS is more challenging. A structural approach
is offered in Antle (1978). To avoid making structural assumptions that would
allow for estimation of these parameters but assume away many of the con-
straints motivating this analysis (e.g. non-separability), we instead follow Di
Falco & Chavas (2006) and assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function of the form U(C) = −C1−r, where r is the relative risk aversion
parameter, to parameterize AP and DS in Equation 4.20. Details are provided in
the methods section.
4.4 Data
The analysis draws on three waves of Living Standards Measurement Study-
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) data from Tanzania: 2008-09,
2010-11, and 2012-13. The survey follows an original 3,280 households from
2008 to 2013; the overall household attrition rate for the panel is 4.84 percent
(NBS 2014).
The Tanzanian setting is particularly compelling for an empirical analysis of
the relationship among risk, returns, and initial asset holdings. As documented
by Christiaensen etal (2013), De Weerdt (2010), Beegle etal (2011), and McBride
(2018), the Tanzanian economy has been undergoing structural transformation,
entailing both migration and the diversification of livelihoods, since the late
1990s.
Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 4.1. All asset variables
are presented in terms of their Tanzanian Shilling (TSh) equivalence, i.e., the
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value one would get from selling the asset. All monetary values are spatially
deflated within-wave using a Fisher Index generated for this purpose by the
Tanzania National Statistics Office. The 2008-09 and 2010-11 data are then in-
flated to 2012-13 values so that all data are in real 2012-13 terms. Total household
expenditures and all asset values have been transformed via inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation (abbreviated as asinh throughout) so as to approximate a
natural log transformation without modifying or sacrificing zero-valued assets.
As seen in Table 4.1, the sample3 is majority rural, with the share of rural
rising significantly by 2012-13 as a consequence of households breaking off, due
to marriage or migration, from the original. Generally, household heads have
completed some primary school education. Household expenditures and plot
size fall over the course of the panel while the value of livestock holdings gener-
ally fall between 2008-09 and 2010-11, likely due to severe droughts that swept
the region in 2009 and 2011, but then recover by 2012-13. The value of business
assets (captial, stock, goods) rises over the course of the panel while the value
of household, fishing, and farming assets follows no discernable trend.
3The summary statistics are reported without survey weights.
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Table 4.1: Tanzania LSMS-ISA summary statistics by year
2008-09 2010-11 2012-13
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Rural 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.84 0.36
Household size 5.48 3.22 5.50 3.40 4.99 3.08
Adult equivalence 4.51 2.66 4.52 2.77 4.08 2.50
Head of household female 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
Head age 46.73 15.32 46.62 15.75 46.06 16.06
Head married 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.69 0.46
Head migrated to this area 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.49
Head has completed ≤ primary 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49
Head has completed primary 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50
Head has completed secondary 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32
Head has completed university 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09
Total household expenditures 15.76 0.76 15.72 0.76 15.61 0.76
Value of plot holdings 9.37 7.17 9.04 7.41 8.68 7.42
Value of bull holdings 1.24 4.03 0.97 3.61 1.17 3.91
Value of cow holdings 2.06 5.08 1.51 4.45 1.75 4.72
Value of steer holdings 0.87 3.51 0.71 3.16 0.84 3.43
Value of heifer holdings 0.88 3.41 0.57 2.81 0.91 3.48
Value of male calf holdings 1.03 3.61 0.55 2.73 0.98 3.51
Value of female calf holdings 1.06 3.68 0.67 3.12 1.03 3.63
Value of goat holdings 2.65 5.24 1.85 4.61 2.21 4.95
Value of sheep holdings 0.83 3.14 0.60 2.73 0.66 2.85
Value of pig holdings 0.71 2.95 0.38 2.20 0.53 2.61
Value of chicken holdings 5.22 5.94 3.64 5.58 4.47 6.08
Value of other livestock holdings 1.80 3.95 1.19 3.51 0.00 0.00
Value of hand hoe farm asset 7.01 4.62 6.88 4.68 6.36 4.69
Value of sprayer farm asset 0.55 2.46 0.46 2.25 0.46 2.22
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Value of ox plough farm asset 0.84 3.20 0.88 3.50 0.86 3.45
Value of seed planter farm asset 0.01 0.39 0.85 3.18 0.81 3.07
Value of ox cart farm asset 0.31 2.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.27
Value of tractor farm asset 0.02 0.65 0.28 1.96 0.25 1.83
Value of tractor plow farm asset 0.03 0.69 0.05 0.91 0.02 0.60
Value of tractor harrow farm asset 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.60 0.02 0.50
Value of shellerthresher farm asset 0.03 0.54 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.41
Value of watering can farm asset 0.13 1.11 0.11 1.05 0.07 0.87
Value of farm buildings 0.55 2.48 0.57 2.55 0.39 2.09
Value of geri cansdrums farm asset 0.88 2.93 0.30 1.80 0.20 1.46
Value of fishing nets 0.27 1.88 0.16 1.42 0.05 0.79
Value of fishing lines 0.18 1.27 0.12 1.12 0.00 0.21
Value of fishing boats 0.28 1.96 0.16 1.47 0.11 1.19
Value of fishing motors 0.07 1.01 0.02 0.52 0.01 0.41
Value of business capital 3.44 5.87 3.73 6.02 4.77 6.08
Value of business stock 0.51 2.44 0.53 2.44 0.95 3.11
Value of business goods 1.98 4.68 2.04 4.73 2.83 5.27
Value of land line phone 0.30 1.86 0.20 1.54 0.06 0.85
Value of mobile phone 5.85 6.13 7.85 5.92 8.33 5.30
Value of fridgefreezer 1.68 4.44 1.85 4.62 1.64 4.32
Value of sewing machine 1.49 4.05 1.38 3.91 1.17 3.60
Value of computer 0.50 2.66 0.50 2.62 0.52 2.63
Value of gaselectric stove 0.93 3.34 0.89 3.26 0.76 2.95
Value of stove 4.47 4.98 5.26 4.98 3.76 4.58
Value of vehicle 0.63 3.24 0.62 3.18 0.54 2.96
Value of motorcycle 0.46 2.60 0.70 3.17 0.87 3.47
Value of bicycle 4.90 6.00 5.34 6.08 4.62 5.80
All monetary values have been transformed via the inverse hyperbolic sine function (asinh)
and are reported in real, spatially delfated, 2012-13 Tanzanian Shilling (TSh). Summary
statistics are reported without survey weights.
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4.5 Methods
We estimate the relationship among initial asset holdings, expected returns, risk,
and downside risk among Tanzanian households as follows. First, we use clus-
ter analysis to identify the set of asset portfolios available in the data. We then
estimate the portfolio-specific moments of the conditional consumption distri-
bution via regression of consumption on a quadratic function of the assets, with
household, time, and portfolio fixed effects as well as controls for time varying
characteristics. These regressions additionally allow us to estimate the contri-
bution of each asset to the mean, variance, and skewness of the conditional
consumption distribution within each portfolio.
Next we estimate the relationship among a household’s initial asset hold-
ings and the riskiness and returns of its asset portfolio using fractional polyno-
mials and a generalized additive model. In addition, making the assumption
that the household utility of consumption is CRRA, we calculate the household
level risk premium associated with each portfolio and estimate the relationship
among initial asset holdings, returns, and the risk premium for each portfolio
using a generalized additive model.
In the following subsections, we detail the methods for each of part of this
analysis.
4.5.1 Cluster analysis
Unsupervised learning methods such as cluster analysis allow for the classi-
fication or grouping of data based on similarity or some other objective func-
tion. Here we use k-medoids cluster analysis, implemented via the partitioning
around medoids (PAM) algorithm developed by Kaufman & Rousseeuw (1990),
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to identify the set of asset portfolios available in the data. PAM has several ad-
vantages over other approaches to clustering, such as k-means; in particular,
because within-cluster dissimilarity is calculated using Manhattan distance (or
L1 distance), PAM is more robust to outliers than is k-means, which minimizes
the sum of squared distance.
The PAM algorithm operates by stepwise selection of an initial set of k∗
medoids, ik, from the set of observations, i, i = 1, ...N, so as to minimize diik , the
distance between cluster medoid and the other members of cluster C(i). The al-
gorithim then iteratively replaces the initial medoids so as to minimize the sum
of within cluster dissimilarities, as shown in the objective function in Equation
4.21 (Hastie et al. 2009),
minC,{ik}k∗1 Σ
k∗
1 ΣC(i)=kdiik (4.21)
To select the appropriate k∗, we rely on the silhouette method (Rousseeuw
1987, Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990). The silhouette method entails calculating
the silhouette width, s(i), for each observation, i, over a set of possible ks, where
k = 1, ...K. The k with the largest average silhouette width, 1NΣ
N
i=1s(i) offers the
best number of clusters, given the clustering method, for compact and well sep-
arated groupings (Rousseeuw 1987), and is therefore selected as k∗.
The silhouette width is the ratio of the difference between the average within-
cluster dissimilarity and the minimum average between-cluster dissimilarity to
whichever dissimilarity (within or between) measure is greater. The silhouette
width for a single observation is calculated as
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s(i) =
b(i) − a(i)
max
[
a(i), b(i)
] (4.22)
Where a(i) is the average dissimilarity between observation i and all the other
members of the cluster to which i has been assigned, and b(i) = min(d(i,C)),
where d(i,C) is the average dissimilarity between i and the members of another
cluster, C, to which i has not been assigned (Rousseeuw 1987).
The intuition behind the silhouette method for identification of the appropri-
ate number of clusters is that it offers a summary of how well each observation
has been clustered by finding the distance between the fit of the observation’s
own cluster and that of the observation’s second best choice cluster (i.e., the
smallest average observation-to-other-cluster distance, min(d(i,C)), is the second
best choice cluster for observation i) and then considering the distance between
these fits as a share of whichever offers the poorer fit – the cluster’s own fit or
the fit of the next best cluster.
The silhouette width, s(i), grows smaller as the own cluster fit grows worse
and larger as it grows better. Likwise, the average silhouette width, 1NΣ
N
i=1s(i),
will range between −1 and 1, with values close to 1 indicating well defined and
separated clusters and those close to −1 indicating misclustered observations.
So as to identify the set of asset portfolios in the data, the cluster analysis is
conducted using only household productive assets data. Note that we are fo-
cused on physical assets only, treating human capital assets, such as education,
as fixed factors of production in this analysis. This exclusion of human capital
assets from the analysis is due the length of the panel data with which our em-
pirical analysis is conducted: the (at most) five year time horizon is too short
for payoffs from human capital investments to be realized. Assuming adequate
data, inclusion of human capital assets would be a valuable extension of the
103
present work.
A total of 41 assets are included in the estimation. These assets include land,
livestock, physical infrastructure such as homes and other buildings, financial
assets such as savings and investments, and transportation, communication,
and enterpreunuerial assets such as vehicles, cell phones, and sewing machines.
The summary statistics for these assets are shown in Table 4.1.
4.5.2 Conditional moments
To identify the conditional moments of the consumption distribution, we follow
Antle (1983, 1987). The uncertainty of the (consumption-based) returns to the
household’s productive assets can be characterized via econometric estimation
of the moments of the relationship between consumption and asset holdings.
Let the relationship Ci ≤ g(xi, zi, vi)− p′zzi +ηi(xi)− Ii be estimated by the reduced
form expression, Ci = f1(xi, β1) + ui1, where f1(xi, β1) = Eˆ[Ci| f (xi)] and E(u1i) = 0.
The advantage of this reduced form approximation of the budget constraint
is that it is explicitly non-separable and it implicitly captures the fact that ac-
cess to credit, as a function of asset holdings, can smooth consumption. The
disadvantage is that it does not control for time varying inputs, zi, which are
endogenous to the relationship between consumption and asset holdings but
are only partially observed in our data.
Let µmi represent the mth moment of household i’s conditional consumption
distribution; e.g., µ1i = Eˆ[Ci| f (xi)]. Then µi2 and µi3 can be estimated as
µ2i = (uˆ1i)2 = f2(xi, β2) + ui2, E(ui2) = 0 (4.23)
µ3i = (uˆ1i)3 = f3(xi, β3) + ui3, E(ui3) = 0 (4.24)
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We exploit the panel nature of the dataset to control for household and time
fixed effects when estimating the conditional moments. To do so, we estimate
a quadratic function of the productive assets with interaction terms for the
cluster-identified portfolios, as specified in Equation 4.25, which presents the
regression equation for the estimation of the first conditional moment, µ1i. For
estimation of subsequent moments, the regressand in Equation 4.25 is replaced
with uˆ1im, where m = 2, 3. Due to the way in which the LSMS-ISA data were col-
lected (consumption data are collected via recall while data on asset holdings
are collected via an account of present asset holdings), so as to ensure that we
are conditioning consumption on the stock of household asset holdings, we use
next period’s consumption as the dependent variable (equivalently we could
use last period’s assets).
Cit+1 = ΣAaβaXita +
1
2
ΣAaβaaX
2
ita + βhhit
ΣK−1k Σ
A
aβaPkXitaPk +
1
2
ΣK−1k Σ
A
aβaaPkX
2
itaPk + Σ
K−1
k βhPkhitPk
+αi + ψt + it
(4.25)
In Equation 4.25, i indexes household, t indexes time, a indexes assets with
a = 1, ...A, k indexes portfolios with k = 1, ...K, and hit is a vector of time varying
household characteristics. As above, the assets included in the analysis are the
41 land, livestock, infrastructure, financial, transportation, communication, and
enterpreunuerial assets observed in the data. Equation 4.25 is estimated with
heteroskedasticity and cluster robust standard errors.
The estimated conditional moments allow us to generate cumulative distri-
bution functions of the conditional consumption distribution for each portfolio
so as to assess the relative stochastic dominance of each portolio. We fit the es-
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timated moments to log normal and gamma distributions, where the shape and
scale parameters are ν and σ, and κ and θ, respectively (Equation 4.26). We use
a simple optimization approach to identify the distribution-specific shape and
scale parameters that best describe the estimated moments, minimizing the ob-
jective function in 4.26 subject to the distribution-specific moments constraints.
We use calculated shape and scale parameters (calculated from the first two es-
timated moments) as starting points to initiate the optimization.
MinQ
Lognormal : ν, σ
Gamma : κ, θ

= (µˆ1 − µ1)2 + (µˆ2 − µ2)2 + (µˆ3 − µ3)2 (4.26)
s.t the following distribution-specific moment constraints,

µm Lognormal Gamma
µ1 = exp(ν + σ2/2) κθ
µ2 = exp(σ2 − 1)exp(2ν + σ2) κθ2
µ3 = exp(σ2) + 2)
√
(exp(σ2) − 1) 2/√κ
Drawing from the distribution produced by the shape and scale parameters
identified by the optimization routine, we then produce CDFs for each portfolio
within each distribution. Finally, the relationships among the estimated condi-
tional moments are estimated via fractional polynomials.
4.5.3 Risk premium
The estimated conditional second and third moments are used to calculate the
portfolio specific risk premia, as derived in Equation 4.20, as µ2i = V(Ci) and
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µ3i = S (Ci)). So as to parameterize AP and DS in Equation 4.20, we follow Di
Falco & Chavas (2006) in assuming a CRRA utility function of the form U(C) =
−C1−r with the relative risk aversion paramete r = 2, making AP = 2/C and
DS = −6/C2.
Finally, the relationships between the risk premium and initial wealth is es-
timated via fractional polynomials. Initial wealth in this analysis is the total
value of the household’s physical asset holdings in the first period under anal-
ysis (2008-09, depending on the date on which the household was first inter-
viewed). As above, all values are in 2012-13 real terms and have been spatially
deflated as well as transformed via the asinh transformation.
4.6 Results
Three asset portfolios were identifed in the data. Average silhouette width per
k and a visualization of the final cluster grouping are shown in Figure 4.1. The
optimal average silhouette width at k = 3 of 0.119 suggests that the identified
clusters are not strongly separated. The cluster plot in Figure 4.1 shows the
projection of the data on to its first two principle components, which account
for 16.3 and 8.3 percent of the total variation in the data, respectively. The el-
lipses provide confidence intervals on the clusters, containing 95 percent of each
cluster’s observations, assuming a multivariate normal distribution. The cluster
plot shows three distinct but overlapping groups, which is what we would ex-
pect to find in the setting under analysis, as asset holdings will not be mutually
exclusive among portfolios. Rather, portfolio cluster assignment is a matter of
extent of asset holdings, a fact that becomes clearer in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.1: Cluster assignment
(a) Silhouette method (b) Clusters
A comparison of household characteristics and asset holdings by assigned
portfolio cluster for those households remaining in the same cluster across all
waves is shown in Table 4.3. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the value of
initial (2008-09) asset holdings as well as consumption for each of the identified
asset portfolios. Despite the overlap in portfolio cluster assignment, portfolio
means are generally statistically significantly different from one another and
suggest distinct asset-based income generating activities in Tanzania. In par-
ticular, households holding asset portfolio 2 (46 % of the observations in the
sample) are more urban and more likely to have migrated, have smaller house-
hold sizes, younger heads of household, and better educated heads; overall,
they own less land, fewer livestock, and less farming equipment. Asset portfo-
lio 2 is largely composed of business, communication, transportation, and en-
treprenuerial assets.
While households with portfolios 1 (52 % of the observations in the sample)
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and 3 (2% of the observations in the sample) are both rural and farm based, those
with portfolio 3 have significantly larger families, older heads of household, and
a greater value of all land, livestock, and farming assets than those households
with asset portfolio 1. Although both rural, those households holding asset
portfolio 1 hold more fishing assets than do those holding portfolio 3.
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Table 4.3: Comparison of asset portfolios
Asset Portfolio 1 Asset Portfolio 2 Asset Portfolio 3 Wald test
N=3,972 obs N=3,553 obs N=178 obs
(or 1,324 hhs) (or 1,185 hhs) (or 59 hhs)
rural 0.95 0.30 0.98 ***
household size 5.08 4.67 8.98 ***
head of household female 0.26 0.27 0.12 ***
head age 49.30 42.16 49.18 ***
head married 0.74 0.65 0.88 ***
head migrated to this area 0.29 0.76 0.57 ***
head primaryed 0.42 0.49 0.47 ***
head secondaryed 0.02 0.23 0.00 ***
head university 0.00 0.02 0.00 NA
plotval 13.82 1.15 14.97 ***
bullval 0.67 0.06 12.82 ***
cowval 1.52 0.19 14.77 ***
steerval 0.32 0.00 11.54 ***
hefval 0.40 0.07 9.20 ***
mcalfval 0.42 0.07 10.75 ***
fcalfval 0.59 0.06 10.17 ***
goatval 2.85 0.16 12.64 ***
sheepval 0.44 0.02 8.40 ***
pigval 0.89 0.04 1.32 ***
chickenval 6.52 0.72 11.36 ***
otlstkval 1.00 0.19 5.21 ***
handhoeval 9.80 1.40 10.29 ***
handsprayval 0.46 0.11 2.86 ***
oxploughval 0.37 0.00 11.96 ***
oxseedval 0.27 0.01 7.68 ***
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oxcartval 0.04 0.00 1.29 ***
tractorval 0.02 0.01 2.74 ***
tractploughval 0.01 0.02 0.00
tractharrowval 0.00 0.02 0.00 *
thresherval 0.03 0.00 0.00 **
watercanval 0.09 0.02 0.30 ***
farmbldgsval 0.51 0.07 3.25 ***
gericanval 0.44 0.10 1.48 ***
fishnetval 0.15 0.11 0.00 ***
fishlineval 0.08 0.08 0.00 ***
fishboatval 0.15 0.15 0.00
fishmotorval 0.02 0.03 0.00
bus capitalval 2.70 5.36 2.41 ***
bus stockval 0.53 0.83 0.47 ***
bus goodsval 1.36 3.38 1.66 ***
phone landval 0.05 0.34 0.14 ***
phone mobileval 3.54 11.03 9.29 ***
fridge freezeval 0.12 4.55 0.24 ***
sewmachval 0.43 2.42 0.50 ***
computerval 0.09 1.23 0.09 ***
stove geval 0.13 2.04 0.26 ***
stove otherval 1.52 8.12 1.97 ***
carval 0.09 1.33 0.00 ***
motorcycleval 0.28 0.92 1.08 ***
bicycleval 4.86 3.29 10.02 ***
All monetary values have been transformed via the inverse hyperbolic sine function (asinh) and
are reported in real, spatially delfated, 2012-13 Tanzanian Shilling (TSh). Standard deviations
have been surpressed to curtail table length but are available on request. Number of households
per cluster is average across the three time periods.
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A comparison (Figure 4.2) of the value of initial (2008-09) asset holdings and
consumption (all periods pooled) by portfolio reveals that households with as-
set portfolio 3 enjoy higher consumption throughout the panel and begin with
greater asset holdings at the start of the panel. Households with portfolio 2 be-
gin with smaller asset holdings in the first period but enjoy a level of consump-
tion similar to those with portfolio 3. The high level of consumption despite
the low value of productive assets exhibited by the households with portfolio
2 is due to the fact that some of the more valuable asset holdings of portfolio 2
households are their human capital assets (such as education, entreprenuerial
skill, etc), which are not accounted for in the total asset valuation in this study.
Figure 4.2: Initial asset holdings and consumption densities by portfolio,
values in asinh 2012-13 TSh
(a) Initial (2008-09) asset holdings (b) Consumption
The diagonal of the transition matrix in Table 4.5 shows that most house-
holds stay in their original portfolio cluster from year to year. However, the off-
diagonals tell us about the direction of mobility throughout the panel. Those
households leaving the low-asset, rural, farm-based portfolio cluster are more
likely to go to the urban off-farm cluster (19.33 %) than to the high-asset, rural,
farm-based cluster (3.58 %). Likewise, those leaving the urban off-farm cluster
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are more likely to go to the low-asset, rural, farm-based portfolio cluster (13.06
%) than to the high-asset, rural, farm-based cluster (.80 % ). Finally, the smallest
portfolio cluster has the greatest mobility (and, as we have seen, the greatest
initial welfare): % of those in the high-asset, rural, farm-based portfolio cluster
will transition to the low-asset, rural, farm-based portfolio cluster while 12.47%
will transition to the urban off-farm cluster. The high rate of transition from the
high-asset farm portfolio to the low-asset farm portfolio suggests that it may not
be easy to maintain the high-asset farm portfolio.
Due to the non-trivial mobility among portfolios, the analyses that follow are
done using only those households – 60% of the total sample – that remain in the
same portfolio cluster over the duration of the panel. Restricting the analysis
to these households introduces selection bias in to the findings, as estimated re-
turns, risk, and downside risk will apply only to those households that decided
to stay within their original cluster over the five year time span either because
they were successful in that portfolio cluster or because they didn’t have the re-
sources to transition out of that cluster. At this point it is not possible to identify
the direction in which this selection issue will bias our results. Because the de-
scriptive task of this paper is to estimate the within-portfolio risks and returns
(rather than the risks and returns associated with portfolio changes, an objective
of future work), we forge ahead with this restriction.
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Table 4.5: Portfolio transition matrix
Time t+1
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
Time t Portfolio 1 77.09 19.33 3.58
Portfolio 2 13.06 86.14 0.8
Portfolio 3 29.1 12.47 58.44
The estimated conditional moments, calculated risk premia, and value of
initial (2008-09) asset holdings are summarized in Table 4.6 for each portfolio,
where pairwise statistical difference of means is assessed via a Tukey-Kramer
test (common letters indicate results are statistically different at the 95% confi-
dence level). On average, households holding portfolio 3 have greater expected
consumption and face greater risk than those households holding portfolios 1 or
2. However, portfolio 3 also has the greatest positive skew, suggesting that this
collection of assets reduces exposure to downside risk. Recall that the house-
holds holding portfolio 3 make up a very small share of the sample (2%) and
that the portfolio is composed of large land, livestock, and other farming assets.
We would expect the consumption of such households to be vulnerable to the
long tail events, such as drought, witnessed in this dataset. However, several
factors, each of which merit further investigation, may be contributing to the
high positive skew of this portfolio: the diversity of the portfolio itself, the abil-
ity of portfolio 3 holders to access credit and/or insurance due to the value of
their asset holdings, consumption smoothing.
Holders of portfolio 2 have conditional consumption that is slightly higher
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but statistically indistinguishable from the holders of portfolio 1. In light of
the high observed consumption of portfolio 2 households (see Figure 4.2) and
the comparatively high education of portfolio 2 households (see Table 4.3), it
is clear that the low conditional consumption estimates for portfolio 2 are due
to the fact that these estimates do not properly account for expected returns to
human capital assets. Likewise, the aggregate value of the portfolio 2 initial
asset holdings is the lowest among all portfolios because portfolio 2 assets are
largely held in terms of human, and not physical, capital. Holders of portfolio 2
face greater variance and greater downside risk than do holders of portfolio 1.
Finally, portfolio 1, composing 52 % of the sample, appears to be the low risk,
low return portfolio.
Across the three portfolios, we see the risk premium rising in expected con-
sumption, which is what we would expect.4.
4Di Falco & Chavas (2006) find that the estimation of risk premia via local approximation, as
we have done, provides an underestimate of the true risk premia in the setting of their analysis
(Sicilian wheat growers). Further analysis is needed to ascertain whether the risk premia we
report are underestimates.
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Table 4.6: Conditional moments, calculated risk premia, and value of ini-
tial (2008-09) asset holdings by portfolio
Portfolio one (1,324 hhs) Portfolio 2 (1,185 hhs) Portfolio 3 (59 hhs)
Mean Std dev Median Mean Std dev Median Mean Std dev Median
Mean, µ1 15.66(a) 0.17 15.68 15.68(b) 0.24 15.68 16.72(a)(b) 2.33 16.78
Variance, µ2 0.36(a) 0.50 0.36 1.10(a) 1.02 0.94 2.71(a) 9.37 1.90
Skewness, µ3 0.10(a) 1.39 0.16 -1.01(a) 3.46 -0.56 8.81(a) 60.12 2.88
Risk premium, R 0.02(a) 0.03 0.02 0.07(a) 0.07 0.06 0.14(a) 0.73 0.07
Initial holdings 14.72(a) 1.67 14.73 13.67(a) 2.91 13.79 16.86(a) 0.61 16.83
Common letters indicate results are statistically different at the 95% confidence level using a Tukey-Kramer test.
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Switching from an across portfolio to a within portfolio analysis, we turn
to non-parametric estimation of the relationship between the conditional mean
and the conditional variance, skewness, and risk premium within each port-
folio displayed in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3 displays the relationship between the
conditional mean and conditional variance estimates within each portfolio. We
see conditional variance (risk) rising slightly in conditional mean (expected re-
turns) in the case of portfolios 1 and 3. In the case of portfolio 2, we see a slight
decline which is likely due to poor accounting for human capital assets in the
estimation. Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the conditional mean
and conditional skewness by portfolio. Positive skewness appears to increase
slightly with expected returns in the case of portfolio 1; there is no clear rela-
tionship in the case of portfolio 3. Finally, there appears to be no clear within
portfolio relationship between the risk premium and expected returns or be-
tween the risk premium and the value of initial asset holdings (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.3: Conditional mean, variance, and skewness, fractional polyno-
mial estimate
(a) Conditional mean and conditional
variance
(b) Conditional mean and conditional
skewness
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Figure 4.4: Conditional mean, risk premium, and initial holdings by port-
folio, fractional polynomial estimate
(a) Conditional mean and risk
premium
(b) Risk premium and initial holdings
Finally, the log normal and gamma distributions for each portfolio, fit via the
optimization specified Equation 4.26, are shown in Figure 4.5. No one portfolio
first order stochastically dominates the others. However, a comparison of the
areas under the CDFs for both the gamma and log normal distributions shows
that portfolio 3 (gamma area of 8.87; log normal area of 11.22) second order
stochastically dominates portfolio 2 (3.40; 3.74) which second order stochasti-
cally dominates portfolio 1 (2.58; 2.47).
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Figure 4.5: CDFs of distributions fit on estimated moments of the condi-
tional consumption distribution
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4.7 Conclusion
Do initial asset holdings determine the riskiness (both upside and downside
risk) and expected returns of a household’s asset portfolio? We have not satis-
factorly answered this question here because human capital investments, which
play an important role in the off-farm asset portolio, are not properly accounted
for in the aggregated initial asset holdings values or in the estimates of risk
and returns. Moreover, we are able to consider only a snapshot in time – a, at
most, five year time span – and do not account for long run welfare dynamics.
These limitations aside, across agricultural portfolios (those holding portfolios
1 and 3), we do find evidence consistent with a pattern in which households
with greater initial asset holdings also hold a riskier portfolios and enjoy greater
returns to their assets. However, we do not find clear within-portfolio relation-
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ships between initial asset holdings and risk.
120
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Table A.1: Comparison of IRIS, Cross-Validation, and Stochastic Ensemble
Accuracy Results
Note: QR(#) = quantile regression estimated at the #th quantile; QRF(#) = quantile regression forest
estimated at the #th quantile.
a Bootstrapped 1,000 times, with replacement, mean reported.
b Bootstrapped 1,000 times, with replacement; 95% bootstrap confidence interval reported, where lower
bound is 2.5% and upper bound is 97.5%.
c Because these bootstrapped estimates were not available in materials made public by IRIS, the estimates
reported here were calculated by the authors based on the replication sample and model.
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Source: Authors and IRIS centers estimates using data and procedures detailed in the text.
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Table A.2: Comparison of IRIS, Cross-Validation, and Stochastic Ensemble
Accuracy Results under Halved and Doubled Poverty Lines
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Note: QR(#) = quantile regression estimated at the #th quantile; QRF(#) = quantile regression forest
estimated at the #th quantile.
a Bootstrapped 1,000 times, with replacement, mean reported.
b Bootstrapped 1,000 times, with replacement; 95% bootstrap confidence interval reported, where lower
bound is 2.5% and upper bound is 97.5%.
Source: Authors and IRIS centers estimates using data and procedures detailed in the text.
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Table B.1: Livelihoods 2004
Cluster one (n=2216) Cluster two (n=558) Difference
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value 95% sgnf
share of household members who completed school
koranic 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.682
primary 0.53 0.26 0.55 0.38 0.229
secondary 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.31 0.000 *
advanced secondary 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.000 *
university 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.000 *
adult education 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.237
share hh mbrs illness/injury free last 4 wks 0.47 0.37 0.55 0.47 0.000 *
total value of household business assets
buildings 80493 2018033 1114888 23600000 0.042 *
vehicles 39839 691173 68549 987709 0.425
equipment 65920 699336 131563 568487 0.040 *
total no. business operated by hh mbrs 0.52 0.61 0.50 0.59 0.488
hours of household labor per capita per week allocated
farm wage labor 0.84 3.43 1.18 7.14 0.108
fishing wage labor 0.11 1.33 0.73 5.82 0.000 *
merchant wage labor 0.19 2.67 0.82 6.48 0.000 *
transportation wage labor 0.23 2.58 0.88 6.28 0.000 *
construction wage labor 0.34 2.46 0.74 5.55 0.011 *
education professional wage labor 0.14 1.22 1.01 5.55 0.000 *
health professional wage labor 0.04 0.66 0.45 4.79 0.000 *
other professional wage labor 0.14 1.71 0.65 4.85 0.000 *
clerical wage labor 0.05 0.78 0.02 0.48 0.456
factory wage labor 0.05 0.88 0.32 3.55 0.001 *
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bar/hotel wage labor 0.11 1.94 0.75 6.24 0.000 *
skilled wage labor 0.42 2.64 3.34 11.93 0.000 *
other wage labor 0.05 0.74 1.17 8.10 0.000 *
fish self employed labor 0.18 1.51 0.22 2.05 0.578
merchant self employed labor 1.17 4.20 4.08 11.95 0.000 *
transportation self employed labor 0.06 1.51 0.40 4.12 0.002 *
construction self employed labor 0.13 1.56 0.06 0.76 0.270
education professional self employed labor 0.01 0.26 0.03 0.67 0.375
health professional self employed labor 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.28 0.220
bar/hotel self employed labor 0.05 0.67 0.35 3.25 0.000 *
skilled self employed labor 0.34 1.76 1.29 6.20 0.000 *
other self employed labor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
own farm labor 6.53 6.94 0.85 3.84 0.000 *
own herd/her processing labor 0.89 1.87 0.12 1.04 0.000 *
total household shamba area (acres) 3.62 4.00 0.17 0.63 0.000 *
total household farm expenditures
hired labor 16642.15 88022.80 69.23 990.04 0.000 *
seeds 3827.66 9612.44 90.52 851.22 0.000 *
fertilizer 577.97 6158.75 0.00 0.00 0.027 *
organic fertilizer 8588.16 46849.34 33.22 554.40 0.000 *
pesticide 1203.47 11328.85 0.00 0.00 0.012 *
transportation 999.77 9771.34 0.00 0.00 0.016 *
other 1675.51 9191.36 2.86 49.98 0.000 *
total quantity of farm asset owned by household
hoes 2.87 1.84 0.17 0.58 0.000 *
axes 0.67 0.64 0.03 0.16 0.000 *
machetes 0.06 0.30 0.00 0.06 0.000 *
picks 0.07 0.38 0.01 0.15 0.000 *
shovels 0.31 0.59 0.03 0.19 0.000 *
wheelbarrows 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.000 *
sickles 1.77 31.86 0.04 0.26 0.202
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pangas 1.23 0.71 0.07 0.27 0.000 *
mundu 0.16 0.47 0.00 0.04 0.000 *
pruning shears 0.06 0.27 0.01 0.09 0.000 *
other tools 1.11 6.44 0.05 0.30 0.000 *
total value of farm asset owned by household
mill 13628.25 355668.00 0.00 0.00 0.366
water equipment 1369.65 12995.18 113.31 2676.56 0.023 *
other 9896.79 31458.28 101.02 1486.71 0.000 *
farm buildings 1864.19 25021.18 172.72 4080.03 0.112
total number of livestock owned by household
sheep/goats 1.65 4.85 0.13 0.93 0.000 *
chicken/fowl 3.41 17.96 1.72 18.09 0.047 *
cattle 0.64 2.97 0.04 0.36 0.000 *
pigs 0.17 0.68 0.03 0.37 0.000 *
other 0.16 1.40 0.01 0.17 0.010 *
savings account (yes/no) 0.11 0.31 0.24 0.43 0.000 *
total value of non-labor income received by household
pension 17950.50 713779.60 0.00 0.00 0.553
insurance 388.49 6576.96 476.46 5284.65 0.770
interest 1342.40 20115.75 9573.61 174182.70 0.030 *
lottery 3.09 85.86 0.00 0.00 0.395
dowry 2051.23 21495.53 0.00 0.00 0.024 *
inheretence 21633.55 269920.50 13282.20 241119.00 0.505
sale of durables 5005.16 62412.82 24032.94 375721.40 0.024 *
other 3272.79 42469.05 5495.46 127769.40 0.495
remittances 18703.15 65523.39 34164.63 118195.60 0.000 *
share of crop in total household crop production
coffee 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.000 *
tea 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.241
tobacco 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.005 *
cotton 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.769
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lumber 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.000 *
banana 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.000 *
cassava 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.000 *
yam 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.000 *
sweet potato 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.000 *
potato 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.000 *
maize 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.000 *
millet/sorghum 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.000 *
rice 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.188
beans/pulses 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.000 *
sunflower seeds 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.001 *
mambara 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.000 *
fruit 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.000 *
vegetables 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.000 *
other 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.000 *
mushrooms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.075
peas 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.000 *
vanilla 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.000 *
Tanzania 0.99 0.11 0.96 0.20 0.000 *
Uganda 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.20 0.000 *
region
Kagera 0.96 0.20 0.59 0.49 0.000 *
Dar Es Salaam 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.31 0.000 *
Arusha 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.000 *
Other 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.18 0.000 *
Dodoma 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.000 *
Kampala 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.044 *
Kigoma 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.018 *
Kilimanjaro 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.044 *
Kyotera 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.292
Mara 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.001 *
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Masaka 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.616
Mbeya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.046 *
Morogoro 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.000 *
Mwanza 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.35 0.000 *
Pwani 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.006 *
Ruka 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.001 *
Shinyanga 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.000 *
Southern 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.568
Tabora 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.068
variables not used in cluster analysis, denoted **
total ann. cons per cap in 2010 Tsh** 396583.20 296019.30 977533.00 671399.60 0.000 *
poor (yes/no)** 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.009 *
share of hh mmbrs ever moved** 0.21 0.24 0.49 0.37 0.000 *
household migrated (outside of ea)** 0.43 0.50 0.82 0.38 0.000 *
average age all hh mmbrs** 23.34 11.86 22.26 8.00 0.041 *
share of hh mmbrs female** 0.51 0.21 0.45 0.35 0.000 *
age of head** 43.73 17.28 32.15 11.92 0.000 *
head is female (yes/no)** 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.570
head is married (yes/no)** 0.79 0.41 0.51 0.50 0.000 *
total children ≤ 5 yrs** 1.10 1.03 0.52 0.79 0.000 *
household size** 5.03 2.55 3.05 2.36 0.000 *
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Figure B.1: 2004 clusters
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Figure C.1: Income density by portfolio, values in asinh 2012-13 TSh
Table C.1: Contribution of assets to portfolio moments
Mean Variance Skew
plotval 0.295∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 2.289∗∗∗
(0.0852) (0.0940) (0.208)
bullval 0.0100 0.563∗∗∗ 3.592∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0434) (0.0859)
cowval 0.642∗∗∗ 1.373∗∗∗ 7.453∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.132) (0.226)
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steerval -0.380∗∗ -0.0104 -24.76∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.271) (0.560)
hefval 1.187∗∗∗ 0.0632 25.13∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.126) (0.195)
mcalfval -0.995∗∗∗ 1.917∗∗∗ -25.05∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.160) (0.304)
fcalfval -0.261∗ -0.694∗∗∗ 0.460
(0.158) (0.173) (0.353)
goatval -0.262∗∗ -1.167∗∗∗ -3.920∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.152) (0.268)
sheepval -0.732∗∗∗ -2.167∗∗∗ -10.50∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.158) (0.300)
pigval 0.583 0.471 24.40∗∗∗
(0.578) (0.380) (0.727)
chickenval 0.142 -1.876∗∗∗ 7.843∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.114) (0.191)
otlstkval 0.642∗∗ 2.346∗∗∗ 11.63∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.189) (0.339)
handhoeval -1.321∗∗∗ 0.488 -39.52∗∗∗
(0.430) (0.420) (0.856)
handsprayval 1.079∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 34.49∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.112) (0.201)
oxploughval 0.407∗∗ 1.833∗∗∗ -7.508∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.155) (0.332)
oxseedval 2.039∗∗∗ 8.027∗∗∗ 9.721∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.365) (0.676)
oxcartval -0.430∗∗ 3.560∗∗∗ -9.323∗∗∗
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(0.203) (0.397) (0.718)
tractorval -0.768∗∗∗ -2.576∗∗∗ -13.21∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.303) (0.567)
tractharrowval -0.664∗ 1.843∗∗∗ -2.899∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.433) (0.727)
thresherval 0.179
(0.334)
watercanval 0.653∗∗ -0.152 0.0123
(0.320) (0.192) (0.256)
farmbldgsval 0.781∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗∗ 13.34∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.125) (0.231)
gericanval 0.0959 -3.344∗∗∗ 8.074∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.138) (0.282)
fishnetval -0.0671 -0.103∗∗ 0.0266
(0.0553) (0.0500) (0.112)
fishlineval -0.0340 0.0637 -0.688∗∗
(0.127) (0.127) (0.290)
fishboatval 0.163∗ 0.0583 0.291
(0.0834) (0.0974) (0.188)
fishmotorval -0.458∗∗∗ 0.236 -0.0607
(0.127) (0.225) (0.562)
bus capitalval -0.539 -2.681∗∗∗ 6.795∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.169) (0.294)
bus stockval 0.0275 10.97∗∗∗ 13.52∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.503) (0.883)
bus goodsval -0.169 -1.278∗∗∗ -3.699∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.363) (0.612)
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phone landval 0.184 0.0741 -0.464
(0.400) (0.354) (0.847)
phone mobileval -0.600∗∗∗ 1.490∗∗∗ 1.490∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.249) (0.403)
fridge freezeval -0.165∗ 0.268 0.635∗
(0.0996) (0.354) (0.378)
sewmachval -0.449 -0.0445 -0.795
(0.316) (0.368) (0.842)
computerval 0.197 -0.0787 -0.134
(0.135) (0.210) (0.607)
stove geval -0.290 -0.940 -1.696
(0.376) (0.615) (1.240)
stove otherval 0.0625 5.663∗∗∗ -35.14∗∗∗
(0.0586) (1.006) (2.136)
carval -0.234∗∗ 0.270 -0.749
(0.0991) (0.251) (0.798)
motorcycleval -0.154 0.393 -1.786
(0.340) (0.866) (1.558)
bicycleval 0.687∗∗∗ 5.741∗∗∗ -16.74∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.237) (0.432)
plotval2 -0.0207∗∗∗ -0.0662∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗
(0.00672) (0.00703) (0.0146)
bullval2 0.0154∗∗ -0.0262∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗
(0.00663) (0.00522) (0.00990)
cowval2 -0.104∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0179) (0.0293)
steerval2 0.0549∗∗ 0.00989 3.150∗∗∗
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(0.0245) (0.0337) (0.0688)
hefval2 -0.177∗∗∗ -0.0401∗∗ -3.480∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0185) (0.0289)
mcalfval2 0.142∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ 3.705∗∗∗
(0.0299) (0.0233) (0.0446)
fcalfval2 0.0409 0.114∗∗∗ -0.0852∗
(0.0263) (0.0248) (0.0507)
goatval2 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗
(0.0173) (0.0233) (0.0403)
sheepval2 0.103∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗
(0.0354) (0.0288) (0.0537)
pigval2 -0.0917 -0.136∗∗ -3.471∗∗∗
(0.0858) (0.0569) (0.108)
chickenval2 -0.0000222 0.330∗∗∗ -1.004∗∗∗
(0.0511) (0.0192) (0.0336)
otlstkval2 -0.134∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -2.063∗∗∗
(0.0507) (0.0318) (0.0572)
handhoeval2 0.118∗ -0.106∗ 4.840∗∗∗
(0.0620) (0.0547) (0.106)
handsprayval2 -0.181∗∗∗ -0.0879∗∗∗ -6.021∗∗∗
(0.0662) (0.0188) (0.0333)
oxploughval2 -0.0519∗ -0.233∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0197) (0.0422)
oxseedval2 -0.300∗∗∗ -1.182∗∗∗ -1.462∗∗∗
(0.0568) (0.0556) (0.103)
oxcartval2 0.0698∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0607) (0.110)
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tractorval2 0.110∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 2.208∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0395) (0.0735)
tractploughval2 0.0837∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.0994
(0.0412) (0.0465) (0.0843)
thresherval2 -0.0323
(0.0576)
watercanval2 -0.217∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ -3.390∗∗∗
(0.0696) (0.0462) (0.0652)
farmbldgsval2 -0.134∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0204) (0.0373)
gericanval2 -0.0181 0.612∗∗∗ -1.558∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.0230) (0.0462)
fishnetval2 0.00685 0.0165 -0.0895∗
(0.00901) (0.0217) (0.0537)
fishlineval2 0.000500 -0.0131 0.0913∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0463)
fishboatval2 -0.0248∗ 0.0171 -0.0755∗
(0.0132) (0.0192) (0.0435)
fishmotorval2 0.0650∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0261) (0.0994)
bus capitalval2 0.100 0.426∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗
(0.0784) (0.0280) (0.0482)
bus stockval2 0.00614 -1.637∗∗∗ -3.134∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0798) (0.139)
bus goodsval2 0.0249 0.198∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0612) (0.103)
phone landval2 -0.0261 0.126∗∗ -0.663∗∗∗
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(0.0676) (0.0620) (0.147)
phone mobileval2 0.118∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗
(0.0428) (0.0453) (0.0737)
fridge freezeval2 0.0708∗∗∗ -0.0917∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0528) (0.0578)
sewmachval2 0.0271 0.0647 -0.419∗∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0585) (0.133)
computerval2 -0.0451∗∗ -0.0834∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0304) (0.0831)
stove geval2 0.0651 0.103 0.816∗∗∗
(0.0615) (0.0966) (0.195)
stove otherval2 0.0172 -1.043∗∗∗ 7.323∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.209) (0.444)
carval2 0.0271∗∗ -0.0266 0.0771
(0.0114) (0.0292) (0.0935)
motorcycleval2 0.0338 -0.00677 0.820∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.115) (0.205)
bicycleval2 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗ 2.760∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0383) (0.0707)
port1 × plotval -0.299∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -2.275∗∗∗
(0.0875) (0.0942) (0.209)
port1 × bullval 0.200 -1.139∗∗∗ -2.671∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.220) (0.449)
port1 × cowval -0.706∗∗∗ -1.435∗∗∗ -7.780∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.124) (0.211)
port1 × steerval 0.312 -0.246 25.11∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.317) (0.644)
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port1 × hefval -1.135∗∗∗ -0.0888 -25.45∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.267) (0.406)
port1 ×mcalfval 0.869∗∗∗ -1.534∗∗∗ 24.81∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.262) (0.423)
port1 × fcalfval 0.0856 0.662∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗
(0.181) (0.211) (0.373)
port1 × goatval 0.245∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 3.807∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.155) (0.279)
port1 × sheepval 0.804∗∗∗ 2.240∗∗∗ 10.44∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.209) (0.366)
port1 × pigval -0.744 -0.555 -24.93∗∗∗
(0.581) (0.393) (0.742)
port1 × chickenval -0.151 1.898∗∗∗ -7.788∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.118) (0.202)
port1 × otlstkval -0.606∗ -2.342∗∗∗ -11.55∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.190) (0.338)
port1 × handhoeval 1.368∗∗∗ -0.351 39.70∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.424) (0.860)
port1 × handsprayval -1.034∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗ -33.85∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.204) (0.447)
port1 × oxploughval -0.295 -1.977∗∗∗ 7.927∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.178) (0.380)
port1 × oxseedval -1.965∗∗∗ -8.193∗∗∗ -9.323∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.410) (0.732)
port1 × oxcartval 0.367 -3.422∗∗∗ 9.440∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.430) (0.871)
port1 × tractploughval 0.0495 -0.236∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗
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(0.0319) (0.0466) (0.0889)
port1 ×watercanval -0.684∗
(0.354)
port1 × farmbldgsval -0.801∗∗∗ -1.226∗∗∗ -13.53∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.146) (0.261)
port1 × gericanval -0.0568 3.414∗∗∗ -8.057∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.175) (0.328)
port1 × fishlineval 0.0186 0.00659 1.126∗∗
(0.150) (0.204) (0.531)
port1 × bus capitalval 0.538 2.699∗∗∗ -6.755∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.167) (0.285)
port1 × bus stockval -0.0135 -10.84∗∗∗ -13.29∗∗∗
(0.0428) (0.501) (0.876)
port1 × bus goodsval 0.162 1.160∗∗∗ 3.674∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.364) (0.613)
port1 × phone mobileval 0.644∗∗∗ -1.888∗∗∗ -1.338∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.263) (0.415)
port1 × fridge freezeval 0.505∗
(0.279)
port1 × computerval -0.362∗ -0.500 -1.492
(0.217) (0.540) (1.364)
port1 × carval 0.244 -0.504 -0.146
(0.414) (0.444) (0.957)
port1 × bicycleval -0.666∗∗∗ -5.850∗∗∗ 17.07∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.253) (0.451)
port1 × plotval2 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0666∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.00697) (0.00745) (0.0157)
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port1 × bullval2 -0.0460∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0330) (0.0686)
port1 × cowval2 0.113∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0173) (0.0275)
port1 × steerval2 -0.0475 0.0273 -3.205∗∗∗
(0.0331) (0.0410) (0.0823)
port1 × hefval2 0.170∗∗∗ 0.0428 3.525∗∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0386) (0.0583)
port1 ×mcalfval2 -0.125∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ -3.670∗∗∗
(0.0398) (0.0383) (0.0615)
port1 × fcalfval2 -0.0151 -0.109∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0535)
port1 × goatval2 -0.0422∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0239) (0.0421)
port1 × sheepval2 -0.112∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -1.594∗∗∗
(0.0387) (0.0358) (0.0618)
port1 × pigval2 0.118 0.149∗∗ 3.554∗∗∗
(0.0863) (0.0592) (0.110)
port1 × chickenval2 0.000786 -0.336∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗
(0.0511) (0.0200) (0.0358)
port1 × otlstkval2 0.126∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0319) (0.0571)
port1 × handhoeval2 -0.125∗∗ 0.0861 -4.869∗∗∗
(0.0622) (0.0552) (0.106)
port1 × handsprayval2 0.173∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 5.905∗∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0340) (0.0747)
port1 × oxploughval2 0.0382 0.253∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗
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(0.0344) (0.0239) (0.0504)
port1 × oxseedval2 0.287∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗
(0.0706) (0.0637) (0.113)
port1 × oxcartval2 -0.0621∗ 0.525∗∗∗ -1.474∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0657) (0.133)
port1 × tractorval2 0.00519 0.0857∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.00868) (0.0159)
port1 × tractploughval2 -0.0877∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0503) (0.0905)
port1 ×watercanval2 0.219∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ 3.381∗∗∗
(0.0760) (0.0222) (0.0381)
port1 × farmbldgsval2 0.136∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0242) (0.0427)
port1 × gericanval2 0.0112 -0.627∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0307) (0.0558)
port1 × fishlineval2 0.00359 0.000795 -0.186∗
(0.0270) (0.0378) (0.101)
port1 × bus capitalval2 -0.1000 -0.430∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.0784) (0.0277) (0.0469)
port1 × bus stockval2 -0.00753 1.615∗∗∗ 3.093∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0794) (0.138)
port1 × bus goodsval2 -0.0256 -0.179∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0616) (0.104)
port1 × phone landval2 -0.00292 -0.156 0.536∗∗∗
(0.00863) (0.101) (0.192)
port1 × phone mobileval2 -0.126∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.0444) (0.0472) (0.0754)
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port1 × fridge freezeval2 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.0494∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
(0.0433) (0.00983) (0.0177)
port1 × sewmachval2 0.0462∗∗∗ -0.0577∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.00848) (0.0152)
port1 × computerval2 0.0659∗∗ 0.161∗∗ -0.184
(0.0305) (0.0700) (0.176)
port1 × stove geval2 -0.0160 0.0487∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.00824) (0.0144)
port1 × stove otherval2 -0.0312∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ -7.368∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.208) (0.444)
port1 × carval2 -0.0284 0.0520 0.0213
(0.0468) (0.0508) (0.111)
port1 ×motorcycleval2 -0.0127∗ -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗
(0.00694) (0.00349) (0.00633)
port1 × bicycleval2 0.111∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ -2.817∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0410) (0.0737)
port2 × plotval -0.290∗∗∗ -0.611∗∗∗ -2.324∗∗∗
(0.0876) (0.103) (0.230)
port2 × bullval -1.831 0.253 -6.927
(1.513) (2.896) (6.817)
port2 × cowval -0.900∗∗∗ -1.982∗∗∗ -6.092∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.477) (0.980)
port2 × hefval -1.051∗∗∗ 1.237∗ -26.59∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.638) (1.058)
port2 ×mcalfval 0.841∗∗ -0.729 23.73∗∗∗
(0.332) (0.612) (0.935)
port2 × fcalfval 0.820∗∗ 1.266∗ 0.934
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(0.405) (0.675) (1.387)
port2 × goatval 0.408∗∗ -0.0366 3.525∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.615) (0.830)
port2 × sheepval 2.659∗ 1.130 16.66∗∗∗
(1.444) (1.062) (3.370)
port2 × chickenval -0.181 1.719∗∗∗ -7.841∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.140) (0.254)
port2 × otlstkval -0.542 -2.119∗∗∗ -11.87∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.212) (0.381)
port2 × handhoeval 1.305∗∗∗ -0.557 39.74∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.429) (0.877)
port2 × handsprayval -0.787∗ -1.612∗∗∗ -32.41∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.352) (0.728)
port2 × tractorval 1.483∗∗∗ 5.672∗∗∗ 20.13∗∗∗
(0.378) (0.590) (1.264)
port2 × farmbldgsval -0.627∗∗∗ -1.634∗∗∗ -10.65∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.294) (1.411)
port2 × gericanval 0.0364 3.280∗∗∗ -7.533∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.213) (0.469)
port2 × fishnetval 0.349∗∗∗ -0.0559 0.791∗
(0.128) (0.163) (0.404)
port2 × fishboatval -0.0741 -0.0671 0.0964
(0.149) (0.185) (0.395)
port2 × fishmotorval 0.420∗
(0.219)
port2 × bus capitalval 0.545 2.684∗∗∗ -6.735∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.170) (0.296)
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port2 × bus goodsval 0.164 1.200∗∗∗ 3.850∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.364) (0.616)
port2 × phone landval 0.171
(0.454)
port2 × phone mobileval 0.673∗∗∗ -1.729∗∗∗ -1.078∗∗
(0.235) (0.258) (0.426)
port2 × sewmachval 0.376 0.170 0.357
(0.326) (0.389) (0.886)
port2 × stove geval 0.359 0.679 2.317∗
(0.394) (0.655) (1.372)
port2 × stove otherval 0.0652 -5.951∗∗∗ 35.81∗∗∗
(0.0700) (1.007) (2.136)
port2 ×motorcycleval 0.0220 -0.125 1.249
(0.382) (0.939) (1.794)
port2 × bicycleval -0.879∗∗∗ -5.462∗∗∗ 16.27∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.245) (0.447)
port2 × plotval2 0.0196∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.00849) (0.00897) (0.0197)
port2 × bullval2 0.252 -0.0922 0.981
(0.222) (0.422) (0.987)
port2 × cowval2 0.141∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.0465) (0.0685) (0.140)
port2 × steerval2 0.00406 -0.0190∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00862) (0.0183)
port2 × hefval2 0.158∗∗∗ -0.152∗ 3.699∗∗∗
(0.0495) (0.0918) (0.153)
port2 ×mcalfval2 -0.122∗∗ 0.0702 -3.518∗∗∗
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(0.0499) (0.0924) (0.140)
port2 × fcalfval2 -0.119∗∗ -0.193∗∗ -0.105
(0.0585) (0.0943) (0.194)
port2 × goatval2 -0.0667∗∗ 0.0172 -0.553∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0966) (0.129)
port2 × sheepval2 -0.399∗ -0.189 -2.530∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.170) (0.523)
port2 × pigval2 -0.00186 0.318∗∗ 2.506∗∗∗
(0.00519) (0.135) (0.285)
port2 × chickenval2 0.00556 -0.306∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0231) (0.0432)
port2 × otlstkval2 0.118∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 2.096∗∗∗
(0.0532) (0.0356) (0.0637)
port2 × handhoeval2 -0.115∗ 0.122∗∗ -4.882∗∗∗
(0.0627) (0.0572) (0.112)
port2 × handsprayval2 0.124∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 5.609∗∗∗
(0.0748) (0.0633) (0.129)
port2 × oxploughval2 0.0150∗∗ 0.0704∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.00643) (0.00852) (0.0407)
port2 × tractorval2 -0.264∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗ -3.691∗∗∗
(0.0616) (0.0892) (0.191)
port2 ×watercanval2 0.0858∗∗∗ -0.168∗ 2.446∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0947) (0.320)
port2 × farmbldgsval2 0.110∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0461) (0.218)
port2 × gericanval2 -0.00232 -0.603∗∗∗ 1.474∗∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0361) (0.0825)
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port2 × fishnetval2 -0.0426∗∗
(0.0183)
port2 × fishboatval2 0.00925
(0.0198)
port2 × fishmotorval2 -0.0528∗ 0.0800∗∗ -0.269∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0394) (0.124)
port2 × bus capitalval2 -0.102 -0.425∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.0784) (0.0282) (0.0485)
port2 × bus stockval2 -0.00993 1.638∗∗∗ 3.127∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0800) (0.139)
port2 × bus goodsval2 -0.0244 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0614) (0.104)
port2 × phone landval2 -0.0335 -0.139∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(0.0767) (0.0173) (0.0327)
port2 × phone mobileval2 -0.129∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(0.0432) (0.0466) (0.0773)
port2 × fridge freezeval2 -0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0887 -0.148∗
(0.0146) (0.0568) (0.0778)
port2 × sewmachval2 -0.0158 -0.0822 0.484∗∗∗
(0.0550) (0.0617) (0.140)
port2 × computerval2 0.0169 0.0968∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0253)
port2 × stove geval2 -0.0750 -0.0639 -0.909∗∗∗
(0.0642) (0.103) (0.215)
port2 × stove otherval2 -0.0434∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ -7.460∗∗∗
(0.0206) (0.209) (0.444)
port2 ×motorcycleval2 -0.0168 -0.0294 -0.749∗∗∗
146
(0.0507) (0.124) (0.237)
port2 × bicycleval2 0.146∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ -2.687∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0398) (0.0734)
Household size 0.0941∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0469) (0.0810)
Head of household female -0.0806 -0.0859 -0.134
(0.0778) (0.0989) (0.194)
Head age 0.0294 -0.223∗∗∗ 1.866∗∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0116) (0.0196)
Head married -0.0201 0.0136 -0.140
(0.0782) (0.120) (0.214)
Head migrated to this area 0.266 -0.596∗∗ -0.420
(0.278) (0.290) (0.477)
head primaryed 0.826 2.699∗∗∗ 12.13∗∗∗
(0.522) (0.258) (0.518)
head secondaryed -0.0186 -0.128∗ 0.303∗
(0.160) (0.0773) (0.160)
head university 0.0885 0.559 -1.687
(0.136) (0.462) (1.181)
port1 × Household size -0.111∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -1.777∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0543) (0.0998)
port1 × Head of household female 0.0748 0.267 0.496
(0.121) (0.189) (0.374)
port1 × Head age -0.0310 0.229∗∗∗ -1.863∗∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0119) (0.0210)
port1 × Head migrated to this area -0.294 0.493∗ 0.214
(0.280) (0.297) (0.498)
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port1 × head primaryed -0.821 -2.759∗∗∗ -12.27∗∗∗
(0.525) (0.274) (0.552)
port2 × Household size -0.111∗∗∗ -0.0699 -1.828∗∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0503) (0.0911)
port2 × Head age -0.0291 0.221∗∗∗ -1.869∗∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0126) (0.0225)
port2 × Head married 0.0529 -0.0592 0.415
(0.0919) (0.138) (0.257)
port2 × Head migrated to this area -0.300 0.689∗∗ 0.262
(0.283) (0.296) (0.497)
port2 × head primaryed -0.857 -2.638∗∗∗ -12.16∗∗∗
(0.522) (0.265) (0.531)
port2 × head secondaryed 0.0600
(0.167)
port1 × thresherval -0.433∗∗ 0.425
(0.209) (0.381)
port1 × fishmotorval 0.696∗∗ -2.140∗∗
(0.294) (0.920)
port1 × phone landval 0.131 1.288
(0.595) (1.129)
port1 × stove otherval -5.816∗∗∗ 35.36∗∗∗
(1.002) (2.137)
port1 × thresherval2 0.0788∗∗ -0.0749
(0.0382) (0.0684)
port1 × fishnetval2 -0.00246 0.0807
(0.0228) (0.0563)
port1 × fishboatval2 -0.0241 0.0362
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(0.0240) (0.0521)
port2 × pigval -1.442 -18.24∗∗∗
(0.940) (1.993)
port2 ×watercanval -1.027∗∗ 4.428∗∗∗
(0.462) (1.586)
port2 × bus stockval -10.97∗∗∗ -13.47∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.885)
port2 × fridge freezeval -0.236 -0.962∗
(0.381) (0.513)
port1 × head secondaryed -0.0957 -1.263∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.471)
Constant 15.82∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.171) (0.322)
Observations 5017 5271 5271
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.583 0.876
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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